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MASS ARRESTS & THE PARTICULARIZED 
PROBABLE CAUSE REQUIREMENT 
AMANDA PETERS* 
Abstract: Three Supreme Court cases—United States v. Di Re, Ybarra v. Illi-
nois, and Maryland v. Pringle—established the need for individualized or par-
ticularized probable cause in multiple-suspect arrests and searches. These 
three Supreme Court decisions have been used by plaintiffs seeking to sue po-
lice departments and municipalities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for civil rights vi-
olations stemming from mass arrests unsupported by probable cause. Oddly 
enough, these decisions have also been relied upon by defendants who allege 
that the law is unclear when it comes to particularized probable cause and 
multiple-suspect arrests. This Article seeks to carefully examine the history of 
mass arrests in America and analyze the probable cause requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment along with existing federal cases on multiple-suspect, 
group, and mass arrests, to demonstrate that the jurisprudence in this area is 
settled and clear. The Fourth Amendment’s probable cause analysis is and 
should be no different for individual arrests than for high-volume arrests. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution mandates that all ar-
rests be supported by probable cause.1 The U.S. Supreme Court has repeat-
edly described probable cause as the facts and circumstances the officer 
knows that would warrant a reasonable, prudent person in believing a crim-
inal offense has been, is being, or will be committed by the suspect.2 Offic-
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 1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 2 Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 
(1975); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 (1972); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); 
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–
76 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925). In United States v. Chadwick, Judge 
Tauro stated: 
We do not handcuff our government agents by requiring that they arrest only when 
the facts upon which they wish to rely would warrant a man of reasonable caution—
as opposed to one of extraordinary sophistication—in concluding criminal activity 
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ers must have probable cause to arrest a specific person.3 The Supreme 
Court calls this particularized probable cause.4 
When officers make an unlawful arrest without probable cause, signif-
icant criminal and civil consequences follow. Evidence seized pursuant to 
that arrest may be excluded or the case may be dismissed. Unlawfully ar-
rested individuals may file civil rights lawsuits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 al-
leging that their Fourth Amendment rights were violated.5 Indeed, this is a 
common § 1983 claim.6 Probable cause is not always easy to establish, par-
ticularly in weak or complex cases.7 This challenge is magnified when of-
ficers arrest individuals en masse. 
Mass arrests happen more frequently than one might imagine. Any 
number of scenarios might give rise to a high-volume arrest: protests, police 
raids, undercover stings, even raucous parties. There are numerous cases that 
illustrate the incidence of mass arrests.8 In 2018, the Supreme Court defended 
                                                                                                                           
was taking place. They are merely required to meet a standard that can be under-
stood by the average reasonably prudent person.  
393 F. Supp. 763, 769 (D. Mass. 1975), aff’d, 532 F.2d 773 (1st Cir. 1976), aff’d, 433 U.S. 1 
(1977). 
 3 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 229–31 (1983) (evaluating whether a confidential in-
formant’s tip established the requisite probable cause for the arrest of a husband and wife); Texas 
v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741–42 (1983) (noting that probable cause is necessary to support the 
seizure of property in plain view); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979) (stating that a search 
or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 
(1967) (explaining that the purpose of the probable cause requirement is protecting constitutional-
ly protected areas from state intrusion until the state has reason to believe that a specific crime has 
been or is being committed). 
 4 Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91. 
 5 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018); see Vodak v. City of Chicago, 639 F.3d 738, 750 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(describing plaintiffs’ primary complaint in a class action civil rights lawsuit as the city of Chica-
go’s decision to arrest 900 people without probable cause). 
 6 DAVID B. BROOKS, TEXAS PRACTICE: CIVIL RIGHTS SUITS § 2.31 (2d ed. 2018) (citing 
excessive force and arrest without probable cause as the two most common § 1983 claims in Tex-
as lawsuits); Tal J. Lifshitz, Note, “Arguable Probable Cause”: An Unwarranted Approach to 
Qualified Immunity, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1159, 1166 (2011) (“[Section] 1983 litigation has sky-
rocketed to combat numerous constitutional violations—with the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition 
against unreasonable searches and seizures being a popular vehicle for such claims.”); Jessica R. 
Lonergan, Protecting the Innocent: A Model for Comprehensive, Individualized Compensation of 
the Exonerated, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 405, 409 (2008) (stating that exonerees fre-
quently raise lack of probable cause in civil rights lawsuits). 
 7 Lifshitz, supra note 6, at 1185 (“The concept of probable cause has been grounded in crimi-
nal law and procedure for over two centuries. Ease of application and clarity, however, are not 
qualities with which the standard is endowed.”). 
 8 See, e.g., Wright v. Cuyler, 563 F.2d 627, 628 (3d Cir. 1977) (considering the arrest of be-
tween eight and twenty persons who fit the description of the assailant); Wong v. Hayakawa, 464 
F.2d 1282, 1282 (9th Cir. 1972) (noting that an undisclosed number of student protesters were 
arrested at one time); Urban v. Breier, 401 F. Supp. 706, 708 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (examining the 
arrest of fifty-four persons). Older opinions also used the phrase “dragnet arrests.” See, e.g., Ed-
 
220 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:217 
the actions of Washington D.C. officers who arrested twenty-one partygoers 
in an abandoned house, sixteen of whom sued alleging that the officers lacked 
probable cause to arrest them.9 In 2015, 177 motorcycle enthusiasts who 
gathered in Waco, Texas were arrested following a confrontation at a restau-
rant that resulted in nine deaths.10 Dozens of bikers are suing the police chief, 
his assistant, the arresting officers, the District Attorney, the Sheriff, the city, 
the county, and state law enforcement officials for Fourth Amendment viola-
tions stemming from those arrests.11 Hundreds of people were arrested fol-
lowing the Occupy Wall Street and Occupy Oakland protests that took place 
in 2011 and 2012.12 After their arrests, many protestors initiated lawsuits al-
leging officers violated their constitutional rights.13 Other cases that received 
less media attention have also challenged mass arrests on Fourth Amendment 
grounds.14 
                                                                                                                           
wards v. Philadelphia, 860 F.2d 568, 571 n.2 (3d Cir. 1988) (referring to the arrest of forty to fifty 
youths as a “dragnet arrest”).  
 9 District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 586 (2018). 
 10 In Waco Biker Melee, 4 of 9 People Shot Dead with Gun Type Police Use, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 
11, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-waco-biker-shooting-20151211-
story.html [http://perma.cc/QFK5-YJRF]. 
 11 Tommy Witherspoon, More Twin Peaks Bikers File Civil Lawsuits, WACO TRIB. (May 15, 
2017), http://www.wacotrib.com/news/courts_and_trials/more-twin-peaks-bikers-file-civil-lawsuits/
article_c5ff8ff4-c8f9-5496-b9d6-02c03c10233f.html [https://perma.cc/3867-BZQQ]. 
 12 80 Arrested at Occupy Wall Street Protest, NBC NEWS (Sept. 24, 2011, 10:12 PM) (reporting 
on eighty arrests made in New York), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/44656667/ns/us_news-life/t/
arrested-occupy-wall-street-protest/#.WmujWKinE2w [http://perma.cc/9XBM-3Q2H] [hereinafter 
80 Arrested]; Michael Cavna, Occupy Oakland: After 2nd Arrest, Comics Journalist Susie Cagle 
Shares Her On-the-Ground Experience, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2012), https://www.washington
post.com/blogs/comic-riffs/post/occupy-oakland-after-2nd-arrest-comics-journalist-susie-cagle-
shares-her-on-the-ground-experience/2012/01/30/gIQAAu7UgQ_blog.html?utm_term=.98dd1c7fc
62f [http://perma.cc/3NQA-HSSC] (reporting on three hundred to four hundred arrests in Oakland). 
 13 See Berg v. New York City Police Comm’r Raymond Kelly, No. 12-CV-3391 (TPG), 2016 
WL 4257525, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2016) (“A reasonable jury could find that police officers 
detained the protestors, without probable cause or a warrant, due to a motive that belies defend-
ants’ claimed privilege.”), rev’d, Berg v. Kelly, 897 F.3d 99 (2nd Cir. 2018); Angell v. City of 
Oakland, No. 13-CV-00190 NC, 2015 WL 65501, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2015) (“Plaintiffs assert 
[they had] a common interest in ensuring that they would not be subject to mass arrests without 
individual determinations of probable cause . . . .”); Gersbacher v. City of New York, 134 F. Supp. 
3d 711, 722 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“Defendants offer no argument based on the pleadings that even 
arguable probable cause [to arrest] existed.”); Tommy Witherspoon, 47 More Bikers Sue Over 
Twin Peaks Arrests, WACO TRIB. (May 13, 2017), http://www.wacotrib.com/news/city_of_waco/
more-bikers-sue-over-twin-peaks-arrests/article_f1f86c73-a30b-5361-8ca3-5433f89c6dfd.html 
[http://perma.cc/W9QX-MHFB]. 
 14 See Wilson v. City of Boston, 421 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding that plaintiff was 
unlawfully arrested at a “job fair” that the police advertised to individuals with open warrants). 
2019] Mass Arrests and the Particularized Probable Cause Requirement 221 
It is important to note at the outset that mass arrests are not inherently 
illegal.15 It is difficult, however, for officers to execute a lawful mass arrest. 
Courts have likened mass arrests to a form of police harassment16 or an act 
of oppression,17 and have determined that arrestees are entitled to a rare, 
judicial form of expunction.18 Following one particularly egregious inci-
dent, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals found in Sullivan v. 
Murphy in 1973 that a mass arrest resulted in “a situation in which the po-
lice did not govern themselves by their ordinary procedures, which are cal-
culated to guard against an arrest without probable cause, even in the case 
of a massive civil disturbance.”19 In this way, mass arrests have the poten-
tial to undermine the rights established by the Fourth Amendment, specifi-
cally the right to an arrest supported by probable cause.20 Although it is 
possible for a cautious law enforcement agency to carry out a large-scale 
arrest without violating civil rights, too often the chaos that precedes the ar-
rests and their unusual circumstances make it impossible to arrest each per-
son while honoring the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirements. 
The aftermath of mass arrests can be costly. Processing and housing 
large numbers of arrestees is expensive.21 The criminal and civil trials that 
                                                                                                                           
 15 See I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1049–50 (1984) (noting that mass arrests can 
be conducted in “full compliance with all Fourth Amendment requirements”).  
 16 See Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 881, 885 (E.D. Penn. 1968) (stating that “mass arrests 
without legal justification, and similar harassment, are so clearly improper”). 
 17 See Morgan v. City of DeSoto, 900 F.2d 811, 814 (5th Cir. 1990) (considering the mass 
arrest of high school students). In Morgan, Judge Reavley stated:  
This court is unable to . . . find any justification for the extent of this operation. . . . 
[W]e can find no explanation for taking every high school student found on the 
parking lot under any circumstances and arresting them, handcuffing them, and 
keeping them in jail for the night as if they were threats to society. Whatever the le-
gal points and the liability, how can any party deny that the criminal justice system 
operated here as an instrument of oppression? 
Id. 
 18 See United States v. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d 536, 539–40 (2d Cir. 1977) (explaining that ex-
punction of an arrest record is a form of equitable relief granted only in “extreme circumstances,” 
such as when the procedures accompanying a mass arrest render judicial determination of proba-
ble cause impossible); Hughes, 282 F. Supp. at 885 (ordering expunctions for “hippies” and other 
protesters who were arrested en masse); Urban, 401 F. Supp. at 713 (ordering arrests of fifty-four 
bikers expunged). 
 19 Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 967 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 20 See Russell Covey, Police Misconduct as a Cause of Wrongful Convictions, 90 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 1133, 1175 (2013) (“[P]olice misconduct remains troubling even where the victim of that 
misconduct is engaged in unlawful behavior. Such misconduct undermines the effectiveness of 
constitutional rules established to protect the bodily integrity, privacy, and autonomy of citizens 
from incursion by the state.”). 
 21 Cassie L. Smith, County Pays First Twin Peaks-Related Lawsuit Bill, WACO TRIB. (Sept. 
29, 2015), http://www.wacotrib.com/news/mclennan_county/county-pays-first-twin-peaks-related-
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follow a mass arrest tax local resources.22 Many mass arrest criminal cases 
are ultimately dismissed by prosecutors because they lack probable cause.23 
Moreover, high-volume arrests strain the criminal justice and judicial sys-
tems in ways that create the potential for additional constitutional torts and 
civil rights violations.24 
Settlements, litigation costs, and attorneys’ fees are easily the highest 
mass arrest expenditures. In 2008, for example, an assistant city attorney for 
Houston boasted that the city’s purse strings were protected by paying § 1983 
plaintiffs just under one million dollars following a mass arrest of 278 peo-
ple.25 But, that amount did not include other litigation-related costs.26 In 
2014, New York City paid arrestees claiming Fourth Amendment violations 
and their attorneys a combined eighteen million dollars, which could bal-
                                                                                                                           
lawsuit-bill/article_462f5c3f-25c5-556a-9400-efd88c606730.html [http://perma.cc/7NHG-4M4A] 
(reporting that county applied for approximately $250,000 in state funds, in part to pay for costs 
associated with housing inmates).  
 22 Id. (reporting that before the first criminal trial had ended, the county spent $1,000,000 on 
extra courthouse security, government employee overtime, and other costs associated with the 
Waco biker mass arrests and their litigation). 
 23 See, e.g., Mitchell v. City of New York, 841 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 2016) (stating that the 
prosecutor declined to prosecute thirty trespassing cases following a mass arrest); Bernini v. City 
of St. Paul, 665 F.3d 997, 1002 (8th Cir. 2012) (reporting that charges against one hundred and 
sixty protesters arrested en masse were all dismissed); Sullivan, 478 F.2d at 956 (noting that anti-
war demonstrators argued that the “unusually high number of dismissals” proved their arrests 
were “without foundation”); Harvey Rice, Judge Rips Kmart Raid's Mass Arrests, HOUS. CHRON. 
(July 29, 2005) https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Judge-rips-Kmart-raid-s-mass-
arrests-1925397.php [http://perma.cc/6NML-Y7GU] (explaining that all 278 individuals arrested 
had their charges dismissed); Tommy Witherspoon, DA Dismisses 15 More Biker Cases in Twin 
Peaks Shootout, WACO TRIB. (May 3, 2018) https://www.wacotrib.com/news/courts_and_trials/
da-dismisses-more-biker-cases-in-twin-peaks-shootout/article_bf47ff08-dec4-56f1-aa82-7926d
5cd9d0e.html [http://perma.cc/BR3L-8JSM] (reporting that, following dismissals, the lead prose-
cutor expects only twenty-five to thirty cases to remain of the more than one hundred and fifty 
initial charges in the Waco Biker shootout cases). 
 24 See Lloyd N. Cutler, Civil Strife and the Law: An Overview, Proceedings of the Thirty-
First Annual Judicial Conference Third Judicial Circuit of the United States, 47 F.R.D. 383, 496–
97 (1968) (commenting on problems that arise within law enforcement during periods of civil 
disorder). Cutler stated, describing arrests occurring in the Third Circuit:  
The normal system of arrests, confinement, preparation of charges, assignment of 
counsel and appearance before a judge was simply not geared to cope with these 
large numbers. . . . [W]e have reason to believe that a significant number were con-
fined for more than two days before their initial court appearance. 
Id. 
 25 Carolyn Feibel, Houston Close to Settling Kmart Lawsuits from ’02 Raid, HOUS. CHRON. 
(June 17, 2008), https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Houston-close-to-settling-
Kmart-lawsuits-from-02-1771312.php [http://perma.cc/3LNK-WBTB].  
 26 Id. 
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loon to thirty-five million before litigation ends.27 And in 2017, McClennan 
County, Texas, where the Waco bikers were arrested, spent one million dol-
lars for added courthouse security, overtime fees, and other costs before the 
first of 154 criminal trials had ended.28 The related civil trials have yet to 
begin. 
The upside of mass arrest civil litigation is that police departments and 
governments receive an opportunity to learn from their mistakes and create 
constitutionally sound law enforcement practices. But, this after-the-fact 
realization comes at great financial cost.29 Furthermore, the Supreme Court 
has acknowledged that § 1983 lawsuits carry substantial social costs due to 
the fear they induce among law enforcement officials and municipalities 
that arrest decisions will be second guessed through harassing lawsuits.30 
Despite their problematic nature, mass arrests continue to occur. Fed-
eral courts have been tasked with addressing Fourth Amendment civil rights 
violations that stem from these cases. Due to their unique facts, arguments, 
and circumstances, the courts have taken different approaches to resolving 
these cases. The Supreme Court addressed group searches and arrests in a 
series of cases often cited by lower federal courts in mass arrest cases.31 The 
First, Second, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits, along with two 
district federal courts, have sided with § 1983 plaintiffs by interpreting the 
law on probable cause for mass arrests in a way that honors the historical 
underpinnings of the Fourth Amendment and these Supreme Court cases.32 
The District of Columbia and the Eighth Circuits have addressed particular-
ized probable cause in the context of riot cases where the mob acted cohe-
sively as a unit.33 Finally, the Tenth Circuit has taken a sharp turn from all 
                                                                                                                           
 27 Erin Durkin, City Pays $18 Million to Settle Lawsuits Stemming from 2004 Republican 
National Convention at Madison Square Garden (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/
new-york/city-pays-18m-settle-rnc-lawsuits-article-1.1581416 [http://perma.cc/Q4GW-9STC]; Jim 
Dwyer, Mass Arrests During ’04 Convention Leave Big Bill and Lingering Mystery, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 7, 2014, at A17. 
 28 Smith, supra note 21. 
 29 See Cindy George, Settlement Reached in ’02 Houston Street Racing Raid, HOUS. CHRON. 
(Apr. 13, 2008), https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Settlement-reached-in-02-
Houston-street-racing-1588940.php [http://perma.cc/9SCL-76UD] (detailing settlements reached 
with more than one hundred plaintiffs following a mass arrest near a street racing venue, and re-
porting that “[l]awyers on both sides conceded that the years of legal wrangling have changed” the 
Houston Police Department for the better). 
 30 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987); see Briggs v. Malley, 748 F.2d 715, 719 
(1st Cir. 1984), aff’d, 475 U.S. 335 (1986) (expressing concern over “the potential ‘chill’ upon law 
enforcement activities which the possibility of personal liability might create”). 
 31 See infra notes 111–155 and accompanying text. 
 32 See infra notes 196–254 and accompanying text. 
 33 See infra notes 261–291 and accompanying text.  
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of the above courts by declaring the law on mass arrests not clearly estab-
lished.34 This Article will carefully analyze each of these decisions.  
 This Article seeks to examine the historical significance of mass arrests, 
analyze their Fourth Amendment probable cause application, and provide 
clarity for federal courts confronted with resolving probable cause issues in 
mass arrest cases. Part I describes the history of unlawful mass arrests in the 
United States.35 Part II details the probable cause requirement as it applies to 
both criminal and civil cases.36 Part III examines the approaches that federal 
courts have used to evaluate probable cause in mass arrests.37 Finally, Part IV 
suggests how governments could reduce the occurrence of mass arrests and 
their accompanying Fourth Amendment civil rights implications.38 
I. THE HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF MASS ARRESTS 
To understand the prevalence of mass arrests, it is important to first ex-
amine their history. Mass arrests arrived in the colonies with British rule.39 
During the American Revolution, British soldiers used general warrants to 
arrest colonists by the dozens.40 It was due in part to these mass arrests, along 
with general searches of homes and personal effects, that the Framers drafted 
the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.41 The language and concepts in-
cluded within the Fourth Amendment—a prohibition against unreasonable 
seizures, the necessities of personal security, warrants that required probable 
cause supported by oaths and assurances, and specific descriptions of the ar-
restee—would have protected against the mass arrests colonists witnessed.42 
Yet, the Fourth Amendment’s ratification did not put an end to mass ar-
rests. They were used to arrest hundreds of women and men in the anti-
venereal raids of the 1910s,43 to rid the country of suspected communists and 
radicals during the earlier half of the 1900s,44 to arrest, discriminate against, 
                                                                                                                           
 34 Callahan v. Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Cty., 806 F.3d 1022, 1028 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 35 See infra notes 39–61 and accompanying text. 
 36 See infra notes 62–155 and accompanying text. 
 37 See infra notes 156–318 and accompanying text. 
 38 See infra notes 319–365 and accompanying text. 
 39 See Tracey Maclin & Julia Mirabella, Framing the Fourth, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1049, 1052–
53 (2011) (detailing the frequency of mass arrests in the British colonies).  
 40 Id. at 1055. 
 41 See id. at 1053–55 (discussing colonists’ legal reaction to general warrants). 
 42 See U.S. CONST. amend IV (protecting against unreasonable searches and seizures). 
 43 Scott Wasserman Stern, The Long American Plan: The U.S. Government’s Campaign 
Against Venereal Disease and Its Carriers, 38 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 373, 390–91 (2015). 
 44 See Justin Hansford, Jailing a Rainbow: The Marcus Garvey Case, 1 GEO. J. L. & MOD. 
CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 325, 344–45 (2009) (explaining the FBI-approved Palmer raids in 1920 in 
which 10,000 immigrants who were considered “leftists” and communists were arrested and de-
ported); Robert P. Wasson, Jr., Resolving Separation of Powers and Federalism Problems Raised 
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and harass African-Americans as “vagrants” during the Jim Crow Era,45 and 
to forcefully end labor strikes.46 These arrests, exercised for discriminatory or 
authority-wielding purposes, violated the constitutional rights of those arrest-
ed.47 Even when mass arrests were executed with legitimate justice concerns, 
criminal procedural rights were often ignored or suspended, perhaps because 
they were too hard to comply with during large-scale arrests. 48 
In the latter half of the twentieth century, experts, policy makers, and 
governments attempted to eliminate mass arrests by creating plans to carry 
out arrests while safeguarding constitutional rights. In the New Deal era, for 
example, criminal justice professionals “understood that policies of mass 
arrest and detention on less than probable cause . . . were simply not sensi-
ble ways of using scarce law enforcement resources.”49 Violent mass arrests 
of civil rights protesters were part of the impetus for sweeping civil rights 
                                                                                                                           
by Erie, the Rules of Decision Act, and the Rules Enabling Act: A Proposed Solution, 32 CAP. U. 
L. REV. 519, 539 n.66 (2004) (“Nationwide raids involving mass arrests without benefit of habeas 
corpus, hasty prosecutions, and mass deportations, conducted under the authority of Attorney 
General A. Mitchell Palmer from 1919–21 in the wake of the Russian Revolution were intended to 
rid the country of Communists, Syndicalists, and others deemed radical.”). 
 45 See Alfred L. Brophy, Reparations Talk: Reparations for Slavery and the Tort Law Analo-
gy, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81, 91 (2004) (detailing the mass arrest of African-Americans in 
Tulsa under Jim Crow laws); Karla Mari McKanders, Sustaining Tiered Personhood: Jim Crow 
and Anti-Immigrant Laws, 26 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 163, 194–95 (2010) (describing 
the discriminate use of vagrancy laws against African-Americans under Jim Crow laws). 
 46 See Sean A. Andrade, Biting the Hand That Feeds You: How Federal Law Has Permitted 
Employers to Violate the Basic Rights of Farmworkers and How This Has Begun to Impact Other 
Industries, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 601, 608 n.32 (2002) (explaining that law enforcement 
staged mass arrests to limit the effectiveness of agricultural strikes); Anjali S. Dalal, Shadow Ad-
ministrative Constitutionalism and the Creation of Surveillance Culture, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
61, 70 n.42 (deeming the mass arrest under the Palmer raids a scandal); Sanjukta M. Paul, The 
Enduring Ambiguities of Antitrust Liability for Worker Collective Action, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
969, 1013 n.173 (2016) (noting that mass arrests were made during the Pullman strikes). 
 47 See Harvey Rishikof & Patrick Bratton, 11/9–9/11: The Brave New World Order: Peace 
Through Law—Beyond Power Politics or Peace Through Empire—Rationale Strategy and Rea-
sonable Policy, 50 VILL. L. REV. 655, 663 n.35 (2005) (noting that the Palmer raids were based on 
“random and indiscriminate information”); Stern, supra note 43, at 390–91 (discussing the mass 
arrests of “suspicious” women during the anti-venereal panic); Wasson, supra note 44, at 540 n.66 
(stating that the Palmer raids violated habeas corpus).  
 48 See Note, The Strange Career of “State Action” Under the Fifteenth Amendment, 74 YALE 
L.J. 1448, 1450 n.15 (1965) (detailing the efforts of the Department of Justice to eliminate the Ku 
Klux Klan in 1871 using mass arrests and mass prosecutions, whilst suspending the habeas corpus 
proceedings); Ryan White, Two Sides of Polygamy, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 495, 497–98 (explaining 
that the mass arrests of polygamists in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s became a public relations 
nightmare for the government in part due to violations of the polygamists’ due process rights). 
 49 Louis Michael Seidman, Akhil Amar and the (Premature?) Demise of Criminal Procedure 
Liberalism, 107 YALE L.J. 2281, 2316 (1998) (reviewing AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITU-
TION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES (1997)). 
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legislation in the 1960s that began under President John F. Kennedy and 
was later enacted by President Lyndon B. Johnson.50 
In the 1960s, after Dr. Martin Luther King’s assassination and the riots 
that followed, Lloyd Cutler, prominent lawyer, presidential legal adviser, 
and White House Chief of Counsel, suggested that there was a critical need 
to maintain the normal criminal and judicial processes following riots, civil 
disobedience, and emergencies that produced mass arrests.51 He described a 
Washington D.C. judge who strove to give every one of the two thousand 
civil rights protestors arrested in that city appointed counsel and appropriate 
bail, and provide other procedural safeguards in spite of the enormous toll 
these measures took on the justice system.52 This judge stated: 
A mass arrest situation like no other we are likely to be confronted 
with, is a test of our commitment to the rule of law. Every effort 
must be made to accord to the citizens involved in these situations 
their full and complete rights, just as at any other time. The courts, 
rather than participate in the symbolic burning of individual rights, 
should be islands of calm in the midst of the hysteria. . . . Whenev-
er American institutions have provided a hysterical response to an 
emergency situation, we have come later to regret it.53  
 After the Civil Rights Movement, a number of police departments 
adopted manuals and policies that addressed how to legally conduct mass 
arrests during large-scale protests, demonstrations, and acts of civil disobe-
dience, if such measures became necessary.54 But when the Vietnam War 
                                                                                                                           
 50 John G. Stewart, When Democracy Worked: Reflections on the Passage of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 145, 149 (2015). Stewart stated:  
Television coverage of police dogs and fire hoses dispersing young protestors, many 
of elementary-school age, coupled with mass arrests of youthful demonstrators that 
filled the city jail, finally provided the impetus Kennedy needed to follow the path 
that Humphrey and others had been urging. Kennedy spoke to the nation on June 11, 
1963 and announced he would send to Congress the most comprehensive and en-
forceable civil rights bill in America’s history. 
Id. 
 51 Cutler, supra note 24, at 498–99. 
 52 Id. at 499. 
 53 Id. at 498–99 (quoting Judge Harold Greene). 
 54 See Wash. Mobilization Comm. v. Jefferson, 617 F.2d 848, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (noting 
that the police department adopted new procedures following unlawful incidents of mass arrest); 
Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (stating that new procedures accompany-
ing mass arrests were adopted following the riots of 1968). Judge Leventhal in Sullivan explained: 
During the widespread rioting and looting that followed the 1968 assassination of 
Dr. Martin Luther King, it became obvious that the customary arrest, booking, and 
arraignment procedures were too cumbersome to be used in periods of massive civil 
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broke out and war protestors marched on the streets, officers yet again re-
sorted to mass arrests to control the chaos.55 The District of Columbia Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals described one day of arrests following the May Day 
demonstrations: 
Some 7,926 arrests took place on Monday, May 3, 1971. These re-
sulted in disorderly conduct charges lodged against 7,599 persons. 
The resulting strains on the criminal justice system were unparal-
leled. Police resources were stretched to the limit; detention facili-
ties were filled to overflowing; the prosecutor’s office was inundat-
ed with complaints; and the Superior Court’s calendar was choked 
for months.56 
During the May Day demonstrations, Washington D.C. officers arrested a 
total of 14,517 people for a variety of misdemeanor offenses related to their 
anti-Vietnam War protests.57 One concern courts and legal observers had 
about these arrests were the number of innocent passersby swept up in the 
process.58 In the following decades, numerous protests—over politics, war, 
international summits, and economic inequality—would be followed with 
large-scale arrests.59 
                                                                                                                           
disorder. . . . In response to the recommendations of various committees appointed 
in the aftermath of the 1968 riots, new procedures were adopted by the Superior 
Court and by the Police Department to expedite the processing of persons arrested 
during large scale disorders. 
478 F.2d at 946 (footnotes omitted). 
 55 See Sullivan, 478 F.2d at 942 (stating that thousands of individuals were arrested in connec-
tion with protests against the Vietnam War).  
 56 Id. at 948. 
 57 Id. at 942–43. 
 58 Id. at 949–50 (articulating the Circuit Court and legal observers’ concern that that innocent 
persons were arrested). Even the Assistant Police Chief indicated uncertainty as to the legality of 
police action, telling the local newspaper that law enforcement “had to do something,” the “right-
ness” of which could be judged by others later. Id. at 949. 
 59 See Vodak, 639 F.3d at 740 (stating that nearly nine hundred arrestees sued on the basis of 
unlawful arrest following protests against the Iraq war); Papineau v. Parmley, 465 F.3d 46, 52–53 
(2d Cir. 2006) (reviewing the mass arrests of Native American protesters of taxation in New 
York); Barham v. Ramsey, 434 F.3d 565, 569 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (detailing the arrest of hundreds of 
protesters in Washington D.C. opposing the 2002 annual World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund meetings); Tracy v. Neuberger, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1184–86 (D. Minn. 2012) (consider-
ing the circumstances of a group arrest outside the 2008 Republican National Convention); 80 
Arrested, supra note 12 (reporting on eighty arrests made in New York following the Occupy 
Wall Street economic inequality protests); Cavna, supra note 12 (stating that three hundred to four 
hundred individuals were arrested after the Occupy Oakland economic inequality protests); 
Durkin, supra note 27 (reporting that New York City settled mass arrest lawsuits after the Repub-
lican National Convention protests). 
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In 2007, after Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans, the Ameri-
can Bar Association (ABA) was tasked with examining mass arrests and the 
way the criminal justice system responds to them.60 One ABA delegate, 
Kim Askew, suggested that constitutional rights be respected following ca-
tastrophes, and that “mass arrests and mass prosecutions are unaccepta-
ble.”61 It is because of this nation’s history with unlawful mass arrests that its 
governments and law enforcement agencies must find ways to diminish their 
occurrence and the constitutional rights violations associated with them. 
II. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR MASS ARRESTS 
Mass arrests continue to plague criminal and civil courts today. In re-
viewing these cases, courts begin their analysis by examining the probable 
cause for the arrest. The reasonableness of the probable cause plays a role in 
both civil and criminal mass arrest cases, but the legal analysis varies. The 
criminal probable cause determination is the genesis for the determination of 
civil liability.62 Therefore, this section will examine the Fourth Amendment’s 
probable cause requirement in both the criminal and civil contexts. 
A. What Is “Probable Cause” in the Criminal Context? 
According to the Fourth Amendment, searches and seizures, including 
an arrest, which is a seizure of a person, must be reasonable.63 Probable cause 
makes the arrest reasonable.64 The origins of the probable cause requirement 
can be traced to the English grand jury, long before the Bill of Rights was 
written.65 At that time, it was (and still is) the quantum of evidence required 
to support a grand jury indictment.66 Over the years, making the probable 
cause determination shifted from the exclusive domain of the grand jury to 
the shared purview of the government actor making the arrest.67 This shift 
took place as probable cause changed from one concept to another. 
                                                                                                                           
 60 See Kim J. Askew, Crisis Does Not Suspend the Constitution, LITIG. MAG., Spring 2007, at 
1–2 (setting out a guide for the justice system during times of disaster in the opening statements of 
the Chair of the ABA’s Litigation Section). 
 61 Id. 
 62 Lifshitz, supra note 6, at 1176 (explaining that some “courts bifurcate the application of 
qualified immunity to probable cause determinations by addressing two levels of objective-
reasonableness analysis—one for Fourth Amendment purposes and one for qualified immunity 
purposes”). 
 63 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 64 See id. (requiring probable cause for searches and seizures). 
 65 ANDREW E. TASLITZ, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 186 (3rd ed. 2007). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
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Scholars suggest that “probable cause” in criminal procedure was pre-
dated by a list of grounds for criminal suspicion,68 which included lifestyle 
factors, reputation, and activities that might suggest a suspect was a crimi-
nal in general.69 Over time, the list of justifications for probable cause gave 
way to the probability that a specific crime had been committed by a specif-
ic person.70 “Gradually probable cause float[ed] free of subjective suspicion 
and mov[ed] toward objective guilt.”71 In this way, probable cause was lik-
ened to evidence supporting an objective assessment of the prospect of 
criminal conviction versus what it had been before: the officer’s subjective 
reason to arrest the suspect.72 
In 1878, the Supreme Court stated that probable cause was an objec-
tive belief that, considering the facts and circumstances, led a prudent and 
cautious person to believe a crime had been committed.73 Though probable 
cause remains an objective standard to this day,74 the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly emphasized its foundation is probability, not certainty.75 The Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeal have suggested probable cause is satisfied with a more-
probable-than-not test.76 The Supreme Court in Brinegar v. United States held 
in 1949 that probable cause requires less evidence than what is required to 
justify a criminal conviction, but requires more than mere suspicion.77 
                                                                                                                           
 68 BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, “BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND PROBABLE CAUSE”: HISTORI-
CAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE 141–42 (1991). 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. (citing Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878)). 
 74 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925) (describing an objective standard 
determined by “the facts and circumstances within [officers’] knowledge and of which they had 
reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable 
caution in the belief” that a crime was committed). 
 75 See District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 586 (2018) (explaining probable cause 
as a flexible concept that requires only a probability of criminal activity); Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U.S. 213, 231–32 (1983) (stating the same). 
 76 See, e.g., Wilkes v. Young, 28 F.3d 1362, 1370 (4th Cir. 1994) (suggesting the quantum of 
evidence required to support probable cause is a “more probable than not” showing); United States 
v. Raborn, 872 F.2d 589, 593–94 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting that decisions from the Fifth Circuit 
require either a preponderance of evidence or “something less” to satisfy the probable cause re-
quirement); United States v. Cruz, 834 F.2d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 1987) (articulating a “more probable 
than not” test for establishing probable cause).  
 77 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949); see Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 
121 (1975) (explaining that the probable cause determination “does not require the fine resolution 
of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands, and 
credibility determinations are seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidence supports a reasona-
ble belief in guilt”). 
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The more-probable-than-not standard allows officers more freedom to 
make arrests without fearing repercussions for error. This standard is more 
reasonable. After all, if jurors are not required to be convinced of guilt be-
yond all doubt at the end stages of the criminal trial, officers should not be 
held to a guilt certainty standard at the early stages of the criminal law pro-
cess.78 The Supreme Court in Brinegar stated: 
Because many situations which confront officers in the course of 
executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be 
allowed for some mistakes on their part. But the mistakes must be 
those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their 
conclusions of probability. The rule of probable cause is a practi-
cal, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that 
has been found for accommodating these often opposing interests. 
Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow 
less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the of-
ficers’ whim or caprice.79  
Probable cause is judged objectively by courts80 using a totality of the cir-
cumstances analysis.81 In 1964, the Supreme Court proclaimed in Beck v. 
Ohio that the constitutionality of an arrest depends upon the following: 
[W]hether at the moment the arrest was made, the officers had 
probable cause to make it—whether at that moment the facts and 
circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had rea-
sonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a pru-
dent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was 
committing an offense.82 
                                                                                                                           
 78 See Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176 (reasoning that the more-probable-than-not standard gives 
law enforcement officers “fair leeway” to keep communities safe). Reflecting on the probable 
cause requirement in Briggs v. Malley, Judge Bownes stated:  
[Probable cause] is a standard whose basic contours a police officer can reasonably 
be expected to know. We recognize, however, that police officers cannot be held to 
the standards of lawyers or judges. It cannot be considered negligence, therefore, for 
a police officer to seek an arrest or search warrant in a merely questionable situation. 
748 F.2d 715, 719 (1st Cir. 1984), aff’d, 475 U.S. 335 (1986). 
 79 Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176 (emphasis added). 
 80 See id. at 176 (stating that probable cause must be based on “facts leading sensibly to their 
conclusions of probability”). 
 81 See Gates, 462 U.S. at 230. 
 82 Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). 
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In sum, where the Fourth Amendment is concerned, the ends never justify 
the means.83 Whether an arrest is reasonable hinges on whether the officer 
had probable cause at the time the arrest was made.84 
B. What Is Probable Cause in the § 1983 Context? 
Reasonableness also plays a role in the civil rights analysis, particular-
ly in the context of unlawful arrest claims. But, the probable cause analysis 
in a § 1983 case is a little more complicated; not all courts agree on which 
analysis to use. To understand the different approaches, it is important to 
first examine § 1983 in general. 
Section 1983 specifies that any governmental authority acting under 
color of law who violates another’s statutory or constitutional rights is liable 
to the injured party.85 An arrest lacking probable cause can be considered a 
violation of the person’s Fourth Amendment rights. Consider what the First 
Circuit Court of Appeals said when it explained the basis for § 1983 civil 
liability: 
[U]nder our system of government the police have a duty to fight 
crime without violating constitutional rights. This is difficult at 
times, but it is what the constitution requires. If we cannot demand 
of our police officers that they recognize when they do not have the 
authority to make a search or effect an arrest, then we have given 
up the very idea of a rule of law. The exercise of police power with-
in the law is the very foundation of the social contract. We should 
expect police officers to have a basic understanding of the limits of 
their power and we must hold them liable when, negligently or in-
tentionally, they overstep these bounds.86 
 There are at least five ways to establish government liability under 
§ 1983 for civil rights violations.87 A plaintiff may allege (1) an unlawful 
governmental policy or decision; (2) an unlawful custom or practice; (3) an 
inadequate training or supervision program; (4) an illegal decision made by 
                                                                                                                           
 83 See id. at 96 (“An arrest without a warrant bypasses the safeguards provided by an objec-
tive predetermination of probable cause and substitutes instead the far less reliable procedure on 
an after-the-event justification for the arrest or search, too likely to be subtly influenced by the 
familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment.”). 
 84 JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES, POLI-
CIES AND PERSPECTIVES 151 (5th ed. 2012). 
 85 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018). 
 86 Briggs, 748 F.2d at 719–20 (footnote omitted). 
 87 Ratliff v. City of Houston, No. CIV.A.H-02-3809, 2005 WL 1745468, at *3 (S.D. Tex. July 
25, 2005). 
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a final policymaking authority; or (5) the government’s endorsement or ap-
proval of unlawful acts.88 Some of these claims are harder to prove than 
others and they vary depending on who is being sued. In general, however, 
plaintiffs must prove two things: (1) the violation of a clearly established 
statutory law or constitutional right; and (2) a reasonable person would have 
been aware of such a law or right when the violation occurred.89 
Although both the criminal probable cause and the civil probable cause 
analyses are grounded in reasonableness, the analysis is different for each. 
Courts and critics suggest that unlike the actual probable cause standard 
that officers, lawyers, and judges use in criminal cases—whether there was 
probable cause to support the arrest—the civil probable cause standard is 
weaker.90 
There are at least two significant differences between the civil standard 
and the actual probable cause standard used in criminal cases. First, in civil 
cases, probable cause is judged using an objective reasonableness stand-
ard.91 Courts examine the facts and circumstances known to officers at the 
time of the arrest, along with the criminal charge’s elements. They then ob-
jectively assess whether the officers had probable cause to arrest. This more 
lenient standard allows officers some room for error.92 Second, though the 
Supreme Court has never adopted or sanctioned this analysis,93 the majority 
                                                                                                                           
 88 Id. 
 89 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
 90 See Oliveira v. Mayer, 23 F.3d 642, 649 n.2 (2d Cir. 1994) (explaining the difference between 
the Fourth Amendment’s and civil litigation’s reasonableness standards is that the latter rests on the 
reasonable man standard, which is less strict); Moore v. Marketplace Rest., Inc., 754 F.2d 1336, 1348 
n.15 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating the same); Lifshitz, supra note 6, at 1163 (criticizing courts for “adopt-
ing a reduced threshold for law enforcement officers seeking immunity”); Teressa E. Ravenell, 
Hammering in Screws: Why the Court Should Look Beyond Summary Judgment When Resolving 
§ 1983 Qualified Immunity Disputes, 52 VILL. L. REV. 135, 145 (2007) (commenting that only “ar-
guable probable cause” is necessary to grant qualified immunity to § 1983 defendants). 
 91 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819 (“By defining the limits of qualified immunity essentially in ob-
jective terms, we provide no license to lawless conduct. The public interest in deterrence of un-
lawful conduct and in compensation of victims remains protected by a test that focuses on the 
objective legal reasonableness of an official’s acts.”). 
 92 Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991). 
 93 Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 168 (2d Cir. 2007) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). In Walczyk, 
Justice Sotomayor, then sitting on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, observed:  
It is not surprising, then, that “arguable probable cause” finds no mention in any Su-
preme Court opinion; the need for a separate term to describe this concept arises on-
ly once we have improperly splintered the “clearly established” inquiry. Because I 
believe “arguable probable cause” is both imprecise and an outgrowth of the first 
flaw in our qualified immunity analysis, I do not agree with the majority’s use of the 
term. 
Id. 
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of Circuit Courts have used an “arguable probable cause” test.94 The First 
Circuit created this standard in 1985 in Floyd v. Farrell, and since then, a 
number of courts have adopted it.95 In Floyd, the First Circuit stated: 
We . . . have held that seeking an arrest warrant is “objectively 
reasonable” so long as the presence of probable cause is at least 
arguable. An officer will be held liable for seeking an arrest war-
rant later found to be without probable cause only if there clearly 
was no probable cause at the time the warrant was requested. We 
think this rule can be extended to warrantless arrests as well . . . . 
Despite a finding of no probable cause at a later hearing, a police 
officer should not be found liable under § 1983 . . . because the 
presence of probable cause was merely questionable at the time of 
the arrest. His qualified immunity is pierced only if there clearly 
was no probable cause at the time the arrest was made.96 
The Eleventh Circuit stated it more succinctly: “[a]rguable probable cause 
exists if, under all of the facts and circumstances, an officer reasonably 
could—not necessarily would—have believed that probable cause was pre-
sent.”97 
Unlike the objective reasonableness standard, which has been adopted 
by all federal courts, the arguable probable cause standard has been harshly 
criticized.98 Judge Bumb, a federal district judge in New Jersey, once com-
                                                                                                                           
 94 See Davidson v. City of Stafford, 848 F.3d 384, 392 (5th Cir. 2017) (finding that the offic-
ers lacked “arguable probable cause” to arrest the defendant); Ismail v. Cty. of Orange, 676 F. 
App’x 690, 692 (9th Cir. 2017) (stating that “arguable probable cause to support an arrest is all 
that is necessary for liability under § 1983”); Huff v. Reichert, 744 F.3d 999, 1007 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(explaining that an officer need only have arguable probable cause to earn protection under quali-
fied immunity); Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1137 (11th Cir. 2007) (identifying “argu-
able probable cause” as the applicable standard in § 1983 cases); Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 
1108, 1120 & n.15 (10th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (referring to “arguable probable cause” as the stand-
ard used to earn qualified immunity); Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 743 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating 
that the defendant was entitled to qualified immunity if he could prove that “arguable probable 
cause” existed at the time of arrest); Cox v. Hainey, 391 F.3d 25, 33 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding the 
defendant to the requirement of showing “arguable probable cause”); Smithson v. Aldrich, 235 
F.3d 1058, 1062 (8th Cir. 2000) (describing “arguable probable cause” as the standard for quali-
fied immunity purposes).  
 95 See Floyd v. Farrell, 765 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1985) (articulating the arguable probable cause 
standard).  
 96 Id. (citations omitted).  
 97 Crosby v. Monroe Cty., 394 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 98 See Lifshitz, supra note 6, at 1159 (arguing the standard is unnecessary); Ravenell, supra 
note 90, at 146 (noting that the Supreme Court has never adopted this standard); David Rudovsky, 
Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and Restricted Remedies, 2005 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1199, 1222 (“Given the fact that probable cause can be established on facts that show only a 
‘fair probability’ of criminal conduct (a ‘practical, nontechnical conception’), to permit ‘arguable’ 
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mented that the standard “is a confusing construct, because it suggests that 
qualified immunity is available whenever fair-minded officers may disagree 
on the presence of probable cause. . . . ‘Qualified immunity does not turn 
upon what an average officer thinks may be reasonable.’”99 Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor, while sitting on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, wrote that 
the standard has never been adopted by the Supreme Court and should no 
longer be espoused because it is a mischaracterization of the law.100 The 
standard has also been roundly criticized by scholars as illogical and one 
that unnecessarily broadens an already generous probabilities-based stand-
ard.101 One critic suggested the standard permits officers immunity “be-
cause they acted ‘reasonably unreasonable.’”102 The Third, Fourth, and 
Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals have not adopted or have outright rejected 
the “arguable probable cause” standard, relying instead on mere objective 
reasonableness.103 Regardless of whether federal courts rely on objective 
reasonableness or arguable probable cause, the analysis in civil cases is 
more lenient than the actual probable cause standard used in the criminal 
context. 
C. What Is Probable Cause in the Mass Arrest Context? 
Although the Supreme Court asserts that probable cause is “not a high 
bar,”104 developing probable cause to arrest a group is often more challeng-
ing than the probable cause assessment in a single-arrest case. As an exam-
ple, consider the Waco cases involving 177 bikers who were arrested en 
masse and charged with engaging in organized crime with intent to assault 
                                                                                                                           
probable cause to justify a search is to degrade the Fourth Amendment’s protections to a very low 
level.”). 
 99 Peterson v. Bernardi, 719 F. Supp. 2d 419, 429 n.9 (D. N.J. 2010) (quoting Rab v. Borough 
of Laurel Springs, No. 08-2413, 2009 WL 5174641, at *5 n.4 (D. N.J. Dec. 18, 2009)). 
 100 Walczyk, 496 F.3d at 165. 
 101 See, e.g., Lifshitz, supra note 6, at 1184 (describing “arguable probable cause” as an over-
ly forgiving standard that should “never result in an award of immunity to defendant officers”).  
 102 Id. at 1160. 
 103 See Blaylock v. City of Philadelphia, 504 F.3d 405, 412–14 (3d Cir. 2007) (conducting an 
objective reasonableness probable cause analysis); Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 898 n.2 (6th 
Cir. 2002) (noting the existence of the arguable probable cause standard only in dicta); Torchinsky 
v. Siwinski, 942 F.2d 257, 261 (4th Cir. 1991) (setting out the “objective reasonableness” test used 
in § 1983 actions). A search has not turned up any Fourth Circuit cases that refer to the phrase 
“arguable probable cause.” 
 104 Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014) (“This Court has repeatedly declined to 
require the use of adversarial procedures to make probable cause determinations. Probable cause, 
we have often told litigants, is not a high bar: It requires only the kind of fair probability on which 
reasonable and prudent [people,] not legal technicians, act.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
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or murder another.105 According to scene and booking photos, most of the 
arrestees were men who shared physical characteristics: shaved heads and 
bushy facial hair.106 Most of the bikers wore the same attire.107 They moved 
rapidly once shots were fired, making it difficult for undercover officers to 
identify who was participating in criminal acts of violence and who was 
trying to escape from the threat of violence.108 Under these facts, the Su-
preme Court’s blanket statement that probable cause is not hard to establish 
seems a bit superficial.109 Without a careful probable cause assessment, 
mass arrests can easily “transform the probable cause test into a meaning-
less measure of suspicion” in which everyone present is swept up by law 
enforcement.110  
 The Supreme Court has laid the framework for assessing probable 
cause in mass arrest cases beginning with individualized or particularized 
probable cause. The following cases will illustrate this framework.  
 One of the first cases to examine multiple-suspect arrests was United 
States v. Di Re, decided by the Supreme Court in 1948.111 In that case, law 
enforcement officials approached a man who was selling counterfeit cou-
pons from his car.112 Officers arrested all three men in the car: Buttitta, 
Reed, and Di Re.113 The first two were implicated in the fraud, but officers 
had no probable cause to arrest Di Re. The Court held it was impermissible 
for the officers to presume Di Re’s guilt from his presence with the others 
or to infer that all parties were guilty when the officers only had evidence 
against two of the men.114 The Court stated: 
                                                                                                                           
 105 John Carroll, DA to Seek to Dismiss Charges Against More Than 20 Twin Peaks Bikers, 
KWTX NEWS (Feb. 7, 2018), http://www.kwtx.com/content/news/DA-to-seek-to-dismiss-charges-
against-more-than-20-Twin-Peaks-bikers-473216573.html [http://perma.cc/YQ37-URDF] (“Po-
lice arrested the 177 bikers after the melee, all of whom were charged with engaging in organized 
crime and all of whom were initially ordered held in lieu of $1 million bonds.”). 
 106 See Waco Biker Shoot Out, CBS NEWS (May 17, 2015), https://www.cbsnews.com/
pictures/biker-gang-shootout-in-waco/ [http://perma.cc/2TV2-L86T] (providing booking photos 
for comparison).  
 107 Id. 
 108 Dramatic Video of Deadly Texas Biker Gang Shootout Leaked, CBS THIS MORNING (Oct. 
30, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FU5TQ80x0nY [perma.cc/2Y9E-Y44N]. 
 109 See Kaley, 571 U.S. at 338 (noting that the probable cause standard is not difficult to 
meet). 
 110 Tracey Maclin, The Pringle Case’s New Notion of Probable Cause: An Assault on Di Re 
and the Fourth Amendment, 2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 395, 435. 
 111 332 U.S. 581 (1948). 
 112 Id. at 583. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at 592–94. 
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The argument that one who “accompanies a criminal to a crime 
rendezvous” cannot be assumed to be a bystander, forceful enough 
in some circumstances, is farfetched when the meeting is [in pub-
lic] . . . and where the alleged substantive crime is one which does 
not necessarily involve any act visibly criminal. . . . Presumptions 
of guilt are not lightly to be indulged from mere meetings.115 
The Court, in the above statement, emphasized that it is possible for crimi-
nal activity to be ongoing without the knowledge of everyone present.116 As 
such, Di Re’s conviction was reversed because the officers lacked probable 
cause to arrest him.117 The Di Re Court explained that although officers may 
have probable cause to arrest a person, they do not necessarily have proba-
ble cause to arrest someone who is with that person at the time of arrest.118 
In this way, the Court held that the officers possessed individualized proba-
ble cause to arrest the two men with Di Re, but did not have individualized 
probable cause to arrest Di Re. As such, his arrest was unlawful. 
The next noteworthy probable cause case involving multiple suspects, 
Ybarra v. Illinois, was decided by the Supreme Court more than 30 years 
later.119 Though it addressed the lawfulness of a search, rather than an ar-
rest, courts have applied Ybarra’s holding to group arrest cases.120 In 
Ybarra, officers obtained a warrant to search a tavern and a bartender 
named Greg for heroin after Greg offered to sell heroin to an informant.121 
When officers arrived to execute the warrant, they discovered ten or more 
patrons inside. For safety reasons, officers patted down each patron with 
one officer returning to search Ybarra’s suspicious cigarette carton.122 He 
                                                                                                                           
 115 Id. at 593. 
 116 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
§ 3.2(e) (5th ed. 2012). 
 117 Di Re, 332 U.S. at 595. 
 118 LAFAVE, supra note 116, § 3.6(c) (“In light of Di Re, it seems clear beyond question that 
the mere fact of present association with a person whom the police have grounds to arrest for 
conduct on some past occasion does not constitute probable cause for the arrest of the associate as 
well.”). 
 119 Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 91 (1979). 
 120 See Callahan v. Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Cty., 806 F.3d 1022, 1028–29 (10th Cir. 
2015) (noting that Ybarra requires that the probable cause be particularized to the individual who 
is arrested in a group arrest scenario); Barham v. Ramsey, 434 F.3d 565, 570–73 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
(applying Ybarra); Wilson v. City of Boston, 421 F.3d 45, 49–56 (1st Cir. 2005) (applying 
Ybarr’s holding); Dinler v. City of New York, No. 04 CIV. 7921 RJS JCF, 2012 WL 4513352, at 
*1–6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2012) (applying Ybarra).  
 121 Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 87–88. 
 122 Id. at 88–89. 
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found heroin inside and arrested Ybarra for drug possession. At his trial, 
Ybarra moved to suppress the heroin, claiming the search was unlawful.123 
The Supreme Court had little difficulty holding the search unlawful.124 
The agents knew nothing about Ybarra except that he was present in a pub-
lic place when officers executed a search warrant.125 The Court cautioned 
that a “person’s mere propinquity to others independently suspected of 
criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause.”126 
The Ybarra Court reiterated that when the standard is probable cause, it must 
be particularized. The fact that officers had a valid warrant to search Greg and 
the tavern did not give them authority to search the tavern’s patrons.127 Each 
patron possessed individual rights against unreasonable searches or sei-
zures. 128 The Supreme Court recognized that the constitutional standard of 
probable cause requires a compromise between law enforcement’s duty to 
protect the community and the people’s right to be free from unlawful inva-
sions of privacy.129 The Court concluded that Ybarra’s rights were violated 
when officers searched him before having particularized probable cause to do 
so.130 
The most recent multiple-suspect Supreme Court case, Maryland v. 
Pringle,131 decided in 2003, reiterated Di Re’s and Ybarra’s holdings. In 
Pringle, officers obtained consent to search a vehicle from the driver after 
detaining him for a traffic violation.132 During the search, officers discov-
ered $763 in the glove compartment and five baggies of cocaine hidden be-
hind a backseat armrest. There were three men in the car: Partlow drove and 
owned the car, Pringle sat in the front passenger seat near the glove com-
partment box with the money in it, and Smith sat in the back seat near the 
hidden drugs.133 Officers gave the men an ultimatum: admit who owned the 
drugs or all would be arrested.134 The men remained silent and officers sub-
sequently arrested all three for drug possession. At the police station, Prin-
gle told police the drugs were solely his. At trial, he moved to suppress the 
                                                                                                                           
 123 Id. at 89. 
 124 See id. at 90–91 (stating succinctly that authorities had “no reason to suppose” that they 
had probable cause to search Ybarra). 
 125 Id. at 91. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. at 91–92. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. at 95 (citing Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176). 
 130 Id. 
 131 540 U.S. 366, 368–69 (2003). 
 132 Id. at 368. 
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 134 Id. at 368–69. 
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drugs arguing the officer lacked probable cause to arrest him, but the trial 
court denied his motion. He appealed.135 
The Supreme Court held that the officers had probable cause to ar-
rest.136 After discussing probable cause generally, the Court engaged in a 
multiple-arrestee probable cause analysis.137 The Court determined it was 
“an entirely reasonable inference . . . that any or all three of the occupants 
[possessed] the cocaine. Thus, a reasonable officer could conclude that there 
was probable cause to believe Pringle committed the crime of possession of 
cocaine, either solely or jointly.”138 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected Pringle’s assertion that 
his arrest was a case of “guilt-by-association.”139 The Pringle Court con-
trasted the facts of the cases Pringle relied upon—Ybarra and De Ri, both of 
which led to insufficient probable cause findings—with the facts of the pre-
sent case.140 In doing so, the opinion delved into a fact-specific analysis, 
comparing the three cases. The Court distinguished Ybarra’s search of pa-
trons in a public tavern from the “relatively small car” where Pringle and 
the other two men were detained.141 Moreover, the Justices believed that the 
large quantity of drugs and cash found inside the car inferred a common, 
criminal enterprise of drug dealing in which all men took part as opposed to 
Ybarra, the “unwitting tavern patron.”142  
The Pringle Court likewise distinguished De Ri because although of-
ficers in that case had information that only two arrestees were culpable, the 
officers arrested all three men in the car.143 The Pringle Court stated that 
when officers can single out guilty parties, they must do so instead of mak-
ing a group arrest. In Pringle, however, none of the men in the car admitted 
to possessing the drugs, which obfuscated the officers’ process of singling 
out the guilty party. Following its brief comparison to Di Re, the Court 
promptly concluded that the officers had sufficient probable cause to make 
the arrest.144 
Pringle draws criticisms from academics and criminal procedure experts 
for several reasons. First, the unanimous, Rehnquist-written opinion is terse, 
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 143 Id. 
 144 Id. at 372–74. 
2019] Mass Arrests and the Particularized Probable Cause Requirement 239 
conclusory, and its holding is insufficiently explained.145 It fails to give lower 
courts a framework for analysis or a replicable application. Second, although 
it is feasible that officers could have arrested all three men for possession, it is 
irrational, based on the totality of the circumstances, that officers could have 
possessed probable cause to arrest only Pringle and not the others. The car 
was not Pringle’s, Pringle was not the driver, and though he was closest to the 
money in the glove compartment, the drugs were next to the back-seat pas-
senger.146 Professor Wayne LaFave suggests that the Court’s conclusion may 
have been “a mere slip of the pen” as there was no logic to support it.147  
Third, the opinion waivers between supporting and contradicting Di Re 
and Ybarra.148 On the one hand, it acknowledges that probable cause must 
be particularized and cites to Ybarra as support for this basic premise.149 On 
the other hand, the opinion offers an “all or any” arrest option when officers 
are confronted with multiple suspects who act jointly to commit a crime and 
refuse to cooperate with the police investigation.150 The Supreme Court has 
never suggested this option in any other case before or since Pringle. 
LaFave concluded, therefore, that the Court seemed to operate from an 
impermissible probable cause assumption that “upon proof of a known fel-
ony by one of the three, arrest of all three [was] permissible.”151 If true, this 
would be in direct contradiction to Di Re’s holding. Another scholar, Tracey 
Maclin, suggested that the Pringle Court merely provided “lip service” to 
particularized probable cause.152 In the end, what is clear is that Pringle is a 
one-off opinion that does not aspire to do more than analyze the unique 
                                                                                                                           
 145 See LAFAVE, supra note 116, §§ 3.2(e), 3.6(c) (observing that the Pringle Court never 
stated or discussed the issue of probable cause, instead seeming to “avoid[] the issue altogether” 
and describing the analysis as weak); Jason D. Johnson, Totality of the Circumstances: Why Indi-
vidualized Suspicion Is No Longer Necessary in the Multi-Suspect Context: Maryland v. Pringle, 
124 S. Ct. 795 (2003), 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 361, 376 (2005) (“[T]he Court did not lay down any help-
ful guidelines or parameters for implementing the test in future multi-suspect scenarios. The Su-
preme Court simply came to the conclusion that in the present case, under the totality of the cir-
cumstances, there was probable cause.”); Maclin, supra note 110, at 406 (calling the opinion 
“compact and cryptic,” while offering only “a cursory statement of black-letter law”). 
 146 See Maclin, supra note 110, at 413–14 (arguing that the facts would suggest the other two 
passengers in the car were more likely the owners or held a greater proprietary interest). 
 147 LAFAVE, supra note 116, § 3.2(e). 
 148 See Maclin, supra note 110, at 413–14 (finding the conflict between Pringle, Di Re, and 
Ybarra “troublesome”). 
 149 Pringle, 540 U.S. at 368–69. 
 150 Id. at 372 (describing as a reasonable inference that “any or all three of the occupants had 
knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control over, the cocaine. Thus, a reasonable officer 
could conclude that there was probable cause to believe Pringle committed the crime of possession 
of cocaine, either solely or jointly”). 
 151 LAFAVE, supra note 116, § 3.2(e). 
 152 Maclin, supra note 110, at 415. 
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facts before it. This is evident from the Court’s fact-intensive analysis and 
the fact-specific distinctions it drew between Ybarra and Di Re.153 Its utility 
in the greater Fourth Amendment probable cause analysis is thus questiona-
ble. 
There is another important point that gets lost in Pringle’s criticism: 
the underlying criminal charge of drug possession. Drug possession requires 
proof of mere knowledge and control over the drugs, which are easy ele-
ments for officers and prosecutors to establish.154 Given the simple charge, 
the tiny car, and the small number of defendants, it is a mistake for parties 
and courts to extrapolate Pringle’s reasoning and holding to complex crimi-
nal charges, intricate fact patterns, or mass arrests. Yet, Pringle is used by 
attorneys representing § 1983 defendants to sow probable cause uncertainty, 
and in doing so, shield officers from civil rights lawsuits.155 
III. IMMUNITY FROM SUIT AND PARTICULARIZED  
VERSUS “GROUP PROBABLE CAUSE” 
Di Re, Ybarra, and Pringle are criminal cases that addressed unlawful 
arrests based upon an alleged lack of probable cause. But, those decisions 
have been used by courts in mass arrest civil litigation to determine whether 
an officer had objective probable cause to arrest and therefore was immune 
from suit. This section will examine § 1983 defendant immunity and how 
the aforementioned Supreme Court precedent has impacted federal courts 
on the standard for probable cause in mass arrest cases. 
                                                                                                                           
 153 Pringle, 540 U.S. at 373–74. 
 154 See Pringle, 540 U.S. at 372 (concluding that it was reasonable to infer that the parties had 
knowledge and control over the cocaine found inside the vehicle); Darryl K. Brown, The Perverse 
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 155 See Defendant Reyna’s Motion to Dismiss at 8, English v. City of Waco, No. 1:17-cv-478-
SS (W.D. Tex. July 14, 2017), 2017 WL 7789107 [hereinafter Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss] 
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cause does or does not exist for a group”); Supplemental Brief of Defendants/Appellants at 3, 
Gambrill v. Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Cty., Nos. 14-3234, 14-3229, 14-3233, 14-3235 (10th 
Cir. Dec. 14, 2015) 2015 WL 9166047 (arguing that Pringle makes an officer’s decision to arrest 
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A. Unlawful Arrest Liability and Immunity 
In the civil rights lawsuits that follow mass arrests, arrestees frequently 
sue the officers involved and the governments or officials responsible for 
the alleged rights violations. Some of these parties may be immune from 
suit for federal claims under § 1983.156 
Officers are the most obvious defendants in § 1983 cases when a claim 
is predicated on an unlawful arrest.157 Members of law enforcement, like oth-
er § 1983 defendants, may be protected from suit by qualified immunity,158 
which “recognizes the hardships of subjecting public officials to the rigors of 
litigation, but it balances that concern against the interest in allowing citizens 
to vindicate their constitutional rights.”159 In the law enforcement context, 
qualified immunity protects a police officer in one of two ways. First, it pro-
tects officers whose “conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”160 
Second, it protects an officer who believed his actions were lawful if his be-
lief was objectively reasonable.161 In this way, qualified immunity ensures 
that only officers who had fair notice that their conduct was illegal can be 
sued.162 
                                                                                                                           
 156 See Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 86–87 nn.7 & 9 (2d Cir. 2007) (explaining 
that qualified immunity only applies to federal claims and the immunity is one to suit, not to liabil-
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 157 BROOKS, supra note 6, § 2.31 (noting that the majority of § 1983 lawsuits are brought 
against municipal officers). 
 158 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340–41 (1986) (discussing the history of this defense that 
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 159 Barham v. Ramsey, 434 F.3d 565, 572 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see Karen M. Blum, The Quali-
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 160 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
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immunity in Malley, Justice White wrote:  
[A]n officer who knows that objectively unreasonable decisions will be actionable 
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it reduces the likelihood that the officer’s request for a warrant will be premature. 
Premature requests for warrants are at best a waste of judicial resources; at worst, 
they lead to premature arrests, which may injure the innocent or, by giving the basis 
for a suppression motion, benefit the guilty. 
Id.  
 162See Jenkins, 478 F.3d at 87 (setting out the protections for officers whose conduct falls 
within reasonable bounds).  
242 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:217 
The law recognizes a difference between an officer who, in hindsight, 
could have made better decisions and an officer who knowingly violated the 
law.163 Officers in the former category and those who act when the law is 
unclear are immune from suit.164 In this way, officers are held to similar, but 
not equal standards in civil and criminal cases.165 The reason the standard is 
objective rather than subjective is that a subjective belief would require tes-
timony from the officer and a trial; the qualified immunity that officers en-
joy shield them not just from liability but from the lawsuit itself.166 
Municipalities and governments may be sued under § 1983, as may 
government officials.167 A municipality may be liable under § 1983 when an 
“action pursuant to official municipal policy . . . caused a constitutional 
tort.”168 Although § 1983’s legislative history indicates municipalities were 
not necessarily intended to be exempt from suit,169 Congress believed they 
could be held liable for their own actions, not for the actions of their em-
ployees.170 Thus, governments cannot be held liable under tort theories of 
respondeat superior or vicarious liability,171 but can be held liable when 
they have created and executed policies that result in deprivations of feder-
                                                                                                                           
 163 See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991) (stating that the law provides protection to 
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(quoting Malley, 475 U.S. at 343).  
 164 See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479–80 (1986) (finding a clear Fourth 
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 168 Monell v. N.Y. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). 
 169 Id. at 669. 
 170 See id. at 665–83, 691 (providing a legislative history and concluding that “a municipality 
cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor”). 
 171 Id. at 691–94. 
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ally-protected rights.172 The Supreme Court has stated that “a municipality 
can be liable under § 1983 only where its policies are the ‘moving force 
[behind] the constitutional violation.’”173 It is the policy that distinguishes 
municipal decisions from employee decisions.174 In order for liability to 
attach to municipalities, however, a municipal employee must violate a con-
stitutional right.175 
In some instances, prosecutors are sued for unlawful arrests.176 Unlike 
officers and municipalities, however, prosecutors are protected by absolute 
immunity when they act within the scope of their duties.177 There are rea-
sons for the prosecutor’s more expansive immunity: 
The common-law immunity of a prosecutor is based upon the 
same considerations that underlie the common-law immunities of 
judges and grand jurors acting within the scope of their duties. 
These include concern that harassment by unfounded litigation 
would cause a deflection of the prosecutor’s energies from his 
public duties, and the possibility that he would shade his deci-
sions instead of exercising the independence of judgment required 
by his public trust.178 
 It is the prosecutor who has the legal knowledge required and authority 
to dismiss a case lacking probable cause.179 Indeed, prosecutors are ethical-
                                                                                                                           
 172 See Vodak v. City of Chicago, 639 F.3d 738, 740, 747 (7th Cir. 2011) (stating that a 
§ 1983 plaintiff must demonstrate that the municipality committed a constitutional tort at the “pol-
icymaking level of government”); Burge v. St. Tammany Parish, 336 F.3d 363, 369 (5th Cir. 
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 173 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). 
 174 Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 479–80. 
 175 Wilson v. Town of Mendon, 294 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 176 See Crane v. Texas, 759 F.2d 412, 427–31 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding prosecutor liable on the 
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 177 Malley, 475 U.S. at 341–42. 
 178 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422–23 (1976) (footnote omitted). 
 179 See Mitchell v. City of New York, 841 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 2016) (noting that the prosecu-
tor declined to prosecute thirty trespassing cases following a mass arrest); Gonzalez v. City of 
Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 530–35 (7th Cir. 2009) (reporting that counts of mob action, resisting arrest, 
and battery for arrested crowd were later dismissed by prosecutors); Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 
938, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (stating that an overwhelming number of May Day arrest cases were 
dismissed for want of prosecution, which plaintiffs argued was an indication that probable cause 
was lacking); Bilick v. Dudley, 356 F. Supp. 945, 948 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (reporting that the prose-
cutor dismissed all charges against the eighty-six defendants arrested). 
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ly bound to dismiss cases that are unsupported by probable cause.180 Conse-
quently, it is uncommon for the prosecutor to be a named defendant in a 
§ 1983 lawsuit. Nevertheless, courts have been asked to examine the actions 
of prosecutors who overstep their traditional roles to exert policymaking 
authority or order unlawful arrests, searches, or seizures.181 When a prose-
cutor acts outside of her traditional duties,182 that conduct may subject her 
to § 1983 liability.183 
Section 1983 is designed to right constitutional wrongs.184 It provides 
equitable relief to a person whose constitutionally-guaranteed rights were 
violated.185 Law enforcement officers, governments, public officials, and 
prosecutors alike should all be wary of mass arrests because the lawsuits 
                                                                                                                           
 180 See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. art. 10, § 9, Rule 3.09 (a) (West 2018) (detailing the 
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 181 See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481–85 (considering whether a county prosecutor was acting to 
create county policy); Crane, 759 F.2d at 431 (finding that the prosecutor was not liable personal-
ly because he was carrying out official duties when he violated a Fourth Amendment right; in-
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 182 See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273–74 (1993) (contrasting the traditional 
duties of the prosecutor with those of a detective or police officer). Justice Stevens in Buckley 
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Id. (citations omitted). 
 183 See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 485 (finding that the prosecutor issued a policy determination 
rather than legal advice, and therefore was acting outside of his prosecutorial function); Rowe v. 
City of Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1280 (11th Cir. 2002) (“To the extent he stepped out of 
his prosecutorial role to perform ‘the investigative functions normally performed by a detective or 
police officer,’ however, [the prosecutor] does not have absolute immunity.”). 
 184 Sullivan, 478 F.2d at 966 (“Assuming a determination of constitutional violations, it is 
undeniable that the Federal courts having subject matter jurisdiction also have broad equitable 
power to remedy and obviate all traces of the constitutional wrong.”) 
 185 Id. 
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that follow may favor plaintiffs.186 Success for plaintiffs often just means 
surviving summary judgment because settlements frequently follow.187  
B. Federal Court Analysis of Probable Cause in Mass Arrest Lawsuits 
In § 1983 lawsuits, plaintiffs commonly claim that officers did not 
have probable cause to arrest them.188 The existence of probable cause is an 
absolute defense to an unlawful arrest claim.189 When a plaintiff alleges a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment predicated upon a lack of probable 
cause to arrest and a defendant raises the existence of probable cause as a 
defense, the court must carefully examine probable cause from an objective 
standpoint and determine whether the officer’s arrest was reasonable.190 The 
reasonableness inquiry is “assessed in light of the legal rules that were 
‘clearly established’ at the time” of the arrest.191 
In 2002, the Supreme Court clarified what “clearly established” means 
in Hope v. Pelzer: 
[Q]ualified immunity operates to ensure that before they are sub-
jected to suit, officers are on notice their conduct is unlawful. For 
a constitutional right to be clearly established, its contours must 
be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand 
that what he is doing violates that right. This is not to say that an 
official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very 
                                                                                                                           
 186 See Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 173, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (stating that the jury 
awarded the plaintiffs arrested following May Day protests a total of $12 million, with each plain-
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ful arrest); Gonzalez, 578 F.3d at 537–39 (noting that six people challenged the lawfulness of their 
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whom sued the city for arresting them without probable cause); Sullivan, 478 F.2d at 966–67 (ex-
plaining that 400 arrestees challenged the lawfulness of their arrests); see also Lopez, 2005 WL 
1770938, at *1–2 (indicating that seventy-seven plaintiffs, out of 278 total arrestees, sued alleging 
that the arrest warrants against them lacked probable cause).  
 189 Gonzalez, 578 F.3d at 537. 
 190 Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 306 (6th Cir. 2010) (using a totality of the circumstanc-
es analysis to determine whether the officer “had knowledge at the moment of the arrest . . . to 
warrant a prudent person . . . in believing . . . that the seized individual ha[d] committed . . . an 
offense”) (internal quotes omitted); Gonzalez, 578 F.3d at 537–39 (examining the merits of unlaw-
ful arrest claims for all charges). 
 191 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987).  
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action in question has previously been held unlawful, but it is to 
say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be 
apparent.192 
Stated another way, this standard protects “all but the plainly incompetent 
or those who knowingly violate the law.”193  
In mass arrest lawsuits, federal courts often rely on the Supreme 
Court’s Di Re, Ybarra, and Pringle decisions to examine the reasonableness 
of the officer’s basis for probable cause and the lawfulness of the officer’s 
actions at the time of the arrest. Some courts and scholars have suggested 
that the multiple-suspect probable cause analysis is challenging.194 Indeed, 
federal judges have sympathized with officers in their decisions about who 
to arrest, how to arrest, and when to arrest a group en masse.195 Some 
courts, particularly in more recent decisions, have had difficulty harmoniz-
ing Supreme Court precedent, which has led them to rule that the law is not 
clearly established and thus the defendants are immune from suit. This sec-
tion will examine these contrasting federal court decisions. 
1. Section 1983 Cases Cited by Plaintiffs 
Though mass arrest litigation arose before the twenty-first century,196 
the issue of whether probable cause is clearly established in mass arrest cas-
es has been raised only recently. Several circuit courts of appeals and feder-
al district courts have followed Supreme Court precedent, and consequently 
have favored plaintiffs in these suits. 
One of the first post-Pringle mass arrest cases was Wilson v. City of 
Boston, decided by the First Circuit Court of Appeals in 2005, in which of-
ficers arrested 192 individuals, including Wilson, the plaintiff, after creating 
                                                                                                                           
 192 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (quotations and citations omitted). 
 193 Malley, 475 U.S. at 341. 
 194 See, e.g., Callahan, 806 F.3d at 1024–26 (observing that the “question of probable cause 
in multi-suspect situations is far from beyond debate”); LAFAVE, supra note 116, § 3.6(c) (arguing 
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cannot be questioned . . . and is not.” (citations omitted)); Urban v. Breier, 401 F. Supp. 706, 711 
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tion of established constitutional standards . . . .”); Sullivan, 478 F.2d at 966 (recognizing the hesi-
tation to second-guess officers’ decision to arrest).  
 196 See, e.g., Sullivan, 478 F.2d at 966–67 (considering the suspension of procedural safe-
guards to ensure the integrity of arrests of thousands following Vietnam May Day demonstrations, 
which subjected officers to litigation to determine whether they had probable cause to arrest). 
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a pretend job fair they advertised to people who had outstanding war-
rants.197 Despite Wilson’s insistence that she did not have any outstanding 
warrants and the fact that police had no criminal record for her, officers ar-
rested her, along with everyone else in attendance.198 She later sued, alleg-
ing her arrest was unlawful.199 
The First Circuit determined Wilson’s arrest scenario was highly unu-
sual: it was not a warrantless arrest supported by probable cause, it was not 
made at the direction of an officer who had probable cause, and it was not 
made pursuant to a lawful warrant.200 Any of these circumstances would 
have legally justified her arrest. In Wilson’s case, not a single officer pre-
sent concluded she had committed a crime, yet she was arrested.201 
Importantly, when the defendant officers alleged on appeal that the 
other 191 arrests were made pursuant to valid arrest warrants, the court re-
sponded by quoting Ybarra: “‘mere propinquity to others independently 
suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable 
cause’ for a[n] . . . arrest.”202 Relying further on the language of Ybarra, the 
First Circuit emphasized that an arrest must be supported by probable cause 
“particularized with respect to that person.”203 The court determined that 
Wilson’s arrest violated the Fourth Amendment and the law prohibiting her 
arrest was clearly established.204 Though the court ultimately held that the 
officer maintained immunity because Wilson was released at the scene once 
officers realized they had erred, it relied heavily on Ybarra to condemn the 
unlawful arrest.205 
In 2006, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals examined 
probable cause in Barham v. Ramsey.206 Barham began with hundreds of 
protesters in Washington D.C. who opposed the annual World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund meetings.207 Officers, believing the protestors 
had committed petty crimes and were planning to impede traffic in the met-
ropolitan area, cordoned off Pershing Park, where many of the protesters 
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gathered.208 Officers subsequently arrested 386 people for failure to obey an 
officer.209 
The arrestees sued alleging the officers unlawfully detained them after 
failing to issue a warning and giving them a chance to disperse.210 The fed-
eral district court found that the officers’ actions were “ludicrous” because 
they never gave an order, which the protestors could not have failed to obey, 
before they arrested everyone.211 The trial court determined that there was 
no probable cause to arrest the group.212 
The D.C. Circuit Court agreed that the officers violated the arrestees’ 
Fourth Amendment rights.213 The court stated that “no reasonable officer 
. . . could have believed that probable cause existed to order the sudden ar-
rest of every individual in Pershing Park.”214 It also noted that even if offic-
ers had probable cause to arrest some protestors, at no point did they have 
probable cause to arrest all protestors.215 The Barham court then reiterated 
what the Supreme Court in Ybarra and other courts have said: an arrest 
must be predicated by particularized probable cause; this prerequisite can-
not be undercut by the fact that officers had probable cause to arrest only 
some criminal actors in the group.216 
The court was particularly bothered that one officer-defendant made no 
effort to identify a single arrestee’s specific criminal acts.217 It also disagreed 
with the idea of a designated area of arrest.218 The Barham court warned 
against making arrests in a “randomly selected zone.”219 Although the court 
acknowledged that its holding did not prohibit officers from arresting an un-
ruly, obstructive, or violent mob, this crowd could not be characterized as 
such.220 Ultimately, the court determined that the officers lacked probable 
cause, and, as a result, some defendants were not immune from suit.221 
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In Papineau v. Parmley, also decided in 2006, the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals examined a § 1983 claim made by several dozen members 
of the Native American Onondaga Nation against New York law enforce-
ment officials following the Nation’s protest on sales taxation.222 After some 
protestors walked onto an interstate to distribute printed materials denounc-
ing the tax, officers indiscriminately arrested all protestors—men, women, 
and children.223 All charges eventually were either dismissed or resulted in 
acquittal.224 
Though the plaintiff class never raised the issue of lack or probable 
cause to arrest, the Second Circuit addressed this issue in the context of an-
other claim.225 The Parmley court found that the officers unlawfully arrest-
ed every one of the several dozen protestors because the officers were una-
ble to identify a single person who had committed the criminal act from 
which all other arrests flowed.226 The court concluded that 
Defendants could not, then, have reasonably thought that indis-
criminate mass arrests without probable cause were lawful under 
these circumstances. Without the ability to identify those individ-
uals . . . defendants cannot . . . justify their actions. Quite simply, 
on the facts alleged, we cannot say as a matter of law that the po-
lice had an objectively reasonable basis to conclude that the plain-
tiffs [violated the law] at the time of the arrests. Defendants were 
accordingly not entitled to qualified immunity.227 
 In rendering its decision, the Parmley court examined the elements of 
the offense and the facts to determine that the officers lacked probable 
cause.228 Even though the court did not rely upon Ybarra, Di Re, or Pringle 
in rendering its decision, its rationale mimicked Ybarra’s particularized 
probable cause language and analysis.229 
The Eleventh Circuit has mirrored Ybarra’s rationale as well. In reject-
ing a request to permit mass searches in its 2004 decision Bourgeois v. Pe-
ters, the court stated the “text of the Fourth Amendment contains no excep-
tion for large gatherings of people.”230 Although this decision was not in 
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response to a § 1983 lawsuit and was based upon a mass search, rather than 
a mass arrest, the reasoning of the court—that the Fourth Amendment re-
quires individualized suspicion231—echoes Ybarra’s particularized probable 
cause requirement. 
In a 2012 mass arrest case, Dinler v. City of New York, the Southern 
District of New York rejected the defendants’ proposed “group probable 
cause” argument.232 In Dinler, protesters, journalists, and bystanders sued 
New York City for their unlawful arrests following protests of the City’s 
2004 Republican National Convention.233 The issue the court was asked to 
address was “how probable cause determinations must be made when the 
police suspect large groups of people of unlawful activity.”234 Citing 
Ybarra, the court stated that being near individuals who are committing 
crimes is not enough to satisfy the probable cause requirement.235 The court 
stated that “probable cause must be particular to the individual being arrest-
ed.”236  
The Dinler court emphasized the Supreme Court’s consistent particu-
larized probable cause precedent by quoting part of the Court’s Pringle 
opinion that relied on Ybarra for support: 
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that, notwithstanding the 
difficulty of defining probable cause precisely, “[t]he substance of 
all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for be-
lief of guilt, and that belief of guilt must be particularized with re-
spect to the person to be searched or seized.”237 
The defendants, unable to articulate particularized probable cause to 
arrest the individuals, alternatively argued that they needed “group probable 
cause” when confronted with a crowd of lawbreakers.238 The Dinler court 
replied that group probable cause was “by no means as firmly established as 
defendants suggest” before relying upon the Second Circuit’s Parmley deci-
sion, which stated that officers are not entitled to indiscriminately arrest a 
mass of people when they lack particularized probable cause to do so.239  
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The court then distinguished two cases the defendants relied upon—
both involving riotous crowds acting together to violate the law.240 The 
court emphasized: 
[While Carr and Bernini] provide insight into how the state can 
preserve public order and enforce the law in mass protest or riot 
situations, . . . they do not, and could not, alter the constitutional 
requirement of individualized probable cause as a prerequisite for 
lawful arrest. Rather, they stand for the unremarkable proposition 
that, where a group of individuals is acting in concert such that a 
reasonable police officer could conclude that every member of the 
group violated the law, that officer would be justified in arresting 
every member of the group. . . . As such, [the two cases] do not en-
dorse a theory of collective or group liability, nor do they reflect a 
departure from the rule of individualized probable cause. They 
merely offer a method of reaching individualized probable cause in 
a large, and potentially chaotic, group setting. Individualized prob-
able cause remains the lodestar in these cases. An individual’s par-
ticipation in a lawbreaking group may, in appropriate circumstanc-
es, be strong circumstantial evidence of that individual’s own ille-
gal conduct, but, no matter the circumstances, an arresting officer 
must believe that every individual arrested personally violated the 
law. Nothing short of such a finding can justify arrest. The Fourth 
Amendment does not recognize guilt by association.241 
In the end, the Dinler court relied upon Pringle, Ybarra, and Parmley to 
support its decision and reject the concept of group probable cause outside 
of unusual, riotous circumstances.242 
Finally, in 2016, the District Court for the District of Columbia held in 
Lane v. District of Columbia that officers violated civil rights in a multiple-
suspect arrest of three men for possession of a gun when they had compel-
ling evidence the gun belonged to only one man in the group.243 The case 
began when officers approached three men sitting on some steps, who they 
suspected were using drugs and drinking alcohol.244 Once officers cleared 
the men of wrongdoing and told them to leave, one man left behind a jacket 
that police discovered concealed a gun. None of the men admitted to own-
ing the jacket. Two of the men, however, were wearing jackets and one was 
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not. Nevertheless, officers arrested all three men for unlawfully possessing 
the firearm.245 
The court framed the issue by asking “whether a reasonable officer 
would have understood that it was unconstitutional to arrest all three men 
for what appeared to be a single crime, when the most compelling evidence 
pointed toward [the man who was not wearing a jacket].”246 After acknowl-
edging that the Supreme Court’s probable cause definition lay between bare 
suspicion and having enough evidence to support a guilty conviction, the 
Lane court stated that officers at a minimum needed some evidence that 
each arrestee committed a crime.247 
The court then examined what is required to arrest multiple individuals 
when the evidence does not clearly point to a single, guilty person.248 The 
D.C. District Court acknowledged that “a ‘round ‘em all up’ approach” is 
plainly unlawful, but “there are times when more than one suspect may be 
arrested for a single crime” as in Pringle.249 The Lane court concluded that 
any suggested “uncertainty [in the mass arrest context] does not mean that 
there is no limiting principle” for mass arrests, citing Barham’s unlawful 
mass arrest scenario for support.250 
The court found that regardless of any present uncertainty, the officers 
were not immune from suit.251 The court’s conclusion rested on Ybarra’s 
basic particularized probable cause premise.252 It was unreasonable that the 
officers would arrest the two men with jackets when they suspected the man 
without one, and thus the arrest of all three men was unreasonable.253 This 
opinion also echoed the sentiment of Di Re by suggesting that when officers 
have probable cause to arrest fewer than all the people in a multi-suspect 
arrest, they cannot arrest everyone.254 In the end, the Lane court relied upon 
Ybarra, Pringle, Barham, and Professor LaFave’s commentary as support to 
deny the defendants’ motion to dismiss the Fourth Amendment unlawful 
arrest claim.255 
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The First, Second, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuit Courts 
of Appeals, as well as federal district courts in New York and the District of 
Columbia, have denied defendants immunity from suit in multiple-suspect 
and mass arrest cases. Whether the arrests stemmed from protests, sting op-
erations, or suspected criminal activity, these courts firmly held that the 
Fourth Amendment requires particularized probable cause for each arrestee. 
By relying upon Di Re, Ybarra, and Pringle, these courts have allowed 
plaintiffs to move forward with civil rights litigation.  
2. Section 1983 Cases Cited by Defendants 
Defendants in mass arrest cases typically make one or two arguments 
in their attempts to dismiss the lawsuits. Some allege adequate probable 
cause; others assert that the law on probable cause in mass arrest cases is 
not clearly established and therefore, officers must maintain immunity from 
suit. Section 1983 defendants argue that Pringle created probable cause un-
certainty, even though it relied on Ybarra’s particularized probable cause 
standard in its holding.256 The federal courts ruling in favor of these argu-
ments fall into two categories: some believe the arrested mass was acting as 
a cohesive, riotous unit and thus, officers were permitted to arrest everyone, 
while others believe that the law on probable cause for group arrests is con-
tradictory and therefore, unable to satisfy the “clearly established” rights 
violation requirement.257 This section will examine both lines of reasoning. 
a. Carr & Bernini: Riot Cases 
The Dinler court referred to two opinions, cited by defendant-officers 
to support their “group probable cause” argument, which the court soundly 
rejected.258 Both involved mass arrests for offenses related to rioting.259 The 
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first case, cited in recent § 1983 litigation,260 is Carr v. District of Columbia, 
which was decided in 2009 by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.261 In that 
case, 250 marchers were arrested following violent protests during President 
George W. Bush’s second inauguration.262 According to police witnesses, 
when one protestor hurled a brick through a police car window, the entire 
crowd cheered and began to throw objects at the police; the police continued 
to observe the crowd act as a unified, angry, destructive mob.263 As officers 
began to arrest them, the group dispersed with around seventy members run-
ning into an alley, where they found themselves corralled between walls and 
officers. All were arrested and charged with rioting. Several of the arrestees 
later sued claiming that their arrests lacked particularized probable cause.264 
The district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment 
on the basis that the officers lacked particularized probable cause to arrest 
each person.265 It relied primarily on the Ybarra and Barham opinions be-
cause officers only generally referred to the “mob” of people when describ-
ing criminal behavior, and could not identify a single member’s specific 
criminal acts.266 The federal district court was troubled that defendants “of-
fered no indication of how the arresting officers could distinguish between 
the protestors and any other person who might have been in the alley at the 
time the arrest was ordered.”267 
On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed the lower 
court’s decision on the unlawful arrest claim.268 The Carr court first sug-
gested that crimes related to rioting could be committed by a group behav-
ing as this one did.269 The court then distinguished its Barham decision 
from the present case by stating that the Barham mass of 386 people was 
not acting as a cohesive mob whereas the Carr group was.270 The court em-
                                                                                                                           
 260 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants Kyle Kirchmeier, Morton County, 
City of Mandan, Jason Ziegler, Stutsman County, and Chad Kaiser’s Motion to Dismiss, Dundon 
v. Kirchmeier, No. 1:16-CV-00406 (D. N.D. Feb. 6, 2017), 2017 WL 3071655 [hereinafter Mem-
orandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss] (“Carr thus demonstrates that a reasonable 
officer . . . could have believed that the Fourth Amendment did not require a probable cause de-
termination with respect to each individual in a large and potentially riotous group before making 
arrests.”); Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 155, at 9–10 (citing Carr, 587 F.2d 401). 
 261 See generally 587 F.3d 401. 
 262 Id. at 403–04. 
 263 Id. at 404. 
 264 Id. at 404–05. 
 265 Carr v. District of Columbia, 565 F. Supp. 2d 94, 100–02 (D.D.C. 2008), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, 587 F.3d 401 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 266 Id. 
 267 Id. at 104 n.14. 
 268 Carr, 587 F.3d at 401. 
 269 Id. at 405–06. 
 270 Id. at 407 (citing Barham, 434 F.3d at 565). 
2019] Mass Arrests and the Particularized Probable Cause Requirement 255 
phasized that “probable cause must be particularized, . . . but . . . that show-
ing is satisfied if the officers have grounds to believe all arrested persons 
were a part of the unit observed violating the law.”271 
Believing it to be “practically impossible” for officers to establish 
probable cause for each mob member, the court acknowledged that an inno-
cent person could have been arrested that day, but probable cause only re-
quired probability of guilt, not certainty of it.272 The Carr court concluded 
that law enforcement need only show that the officers were reasonable in 
believing that everyone arrested had engaged in criminal conduct.273 Im-
portantly, however, the court believed that there were enough issues of fact 
for the case to reach a jury, thus denying the officers’ attempts to maintain 
immunity from suit.274  
Although at least one federal district court found Carr’s wisdom 
“questionable,”275 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with it in 2015 
in Lyall v. City of Los Angeles.276 The Lyall court stated that officers are not 
required to have individualized suspicion for each group member detained 
when officers believe the group is acting as one and it is impossible for of-
ficers to separate the guilty from the innocent.277 The Ninth Circuit empha-
sized the importance of public safety and an officer’s right to investigate 
when there is a belief that criminal activity is afoot.278 The Lyall court inter-
preted Ybarra this way: 
Ybarra stands for the proposition that, if a person is simply present 
[near] potential criminal activity, without . . . engaging in criminal 
activity . . . the police do not have probable cause to search him or 
reasonable suspicion sufficient to detain him . . . . Ybarra does not, 
however, imply that the police can never possess reasonable suspi-
cion or probable cause unless it is individualized. If a group or 
crowd of people is behaving as a unit and it is not possible (as it 
was in Ybarra) for the police to tell who is armed and dangerous or 
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engaging in criminal acts and who is not, the police can have rea-
sonable suspicion as to the members of the group.279 
Lyall thus strays further from Carr’s reasoning by stating that when officers 
cannot parse the guilty from the innocent, they are not required to have in-
dividualized suspicion.280 Carr, on the other hand, upheld the officers’ mass 
arrest by finding that they had a reasonable belief that there were no inno-
cents in the group.281 Both decisions stray too far from the requirements of 
the Fourth Amendment. That officers find it difficult or impossible to ascer-
tain who is guilty from who is innocent should not dispose of the individu-
alized reasonable suspicion or particularized probable cause requirements. 
The second riot decision referenced in Dinler282 is the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals’ opinion from 2012 in Bernini v. City of St. Paul.283 In that 
case, after several days of political protests during the 2008 Republican Na-
tional Convention, an official closed routes to St. Paul’s downtown area. 
When a group of nearly 360 protestors committed acts of violence aimed at 
barricaded officers and attempted to march towards an area where First La-
dy Laura Bush was traveling via motorcade, officers detained the crowd.284 
The police officers then determined through investigation that 200 of those 
detained should be released and only 160 of them should be arrested. Even-
tually, all criminal charges were dismissed and thirty-two protestors sued 
the city claiming that officers had lacked probable cause to arrest them. The 
district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and the 
plaintiffs appealed to the Eighth Circuit.285 
On appeal, the issue before the Bernini court was whether the officers 
violated the Fourth Amendment by arresting the crowd when they had par-
ticularized probable cause to arrest only a few individuals. The Bernini 
court was quick to distinguish Ybarra by stating “[w]hat is reasonable in the 
context of a potential large-scale urban riot may be different from what is 
reasonable in the relative calm of a tavern with a dozen patrons.”286 The 
Bernini court relied upon the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Carr to reach its 
conclusion that the officers’ actions were reasonable.287 
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The court was not entirely clear, however, about which group of pro-
testors the police had probable cause to arrest. The Bernini court held that 
the officers were permitted to arrest sixteen of the plaintiffs because video 
footage showed that they were preparing to violently confront officers im-
mediately before their arrest.288 Another group whose members outnum-
bered officers and was heading towards First Lady Bush was also lawfully 
arrested, according to the court.289 From the opinion, it is unclear how many 
people were in that group and of those, how many were arrested. Neverthe-
less, the Eighth Circuit held that the mass arrest of approximately one hun-
dred people, including nine Bernini plaintiffs, was reasonable because they 
appeared to join the protestors and they outnumbered officers, even though 
there is no indication they engaged in any criminal activity. The court be-
lieved the officers acted reasonably by investigating, even if they did so 
only after they had detained the large group, and by releasing more than 
half of those detained later. Without further analysis, the court concluded 
that the officers maintained their qualified immunity from suit.290 
The Bernini opinion is illogical and under-explained. The decision fo-
cused on officer safety, the peril the group may have caused had they 
reached the First Lady, and the fact that arrestees outnumbered the officers. 
It does not adequately explain how officers had probable cause to arrest 
each of the three separate groups of protestors, much less each protestor. 
Yet, Bernini has been used as legal support by subsequent defendants facing 
§ 1983 civil rights litigation.291 
Perhaps the cases in this section can be meaningfully distinguished 
based solely upon the charges the arrestees faced or the way the masses act-
ed. These cases could also be more narrowly read as sanctioning the arrest 
of a mass if there is particularized probable cause supported by evidence 
that the mass acted both criminally and cohesively.  
b. Callahan: The Not “Clearly Established” Case 
Section 1983’s “clearly established” standard divides defendants who 
knowingly violated a clearly established right and thus waived qualified 
immunity from those who did not violate a clearly established right and thus 
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 289 Id. at 1004–05. 
 290 Id. at 1005. 
 291 See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 260, at 24 
(drawing similarities between the plaintiffs’ claims and the situation in Bernini); Defendant’s 
Motion to Dismiss, supra note 155, at 8 (citing Bernini for the proposition that an officer could 
find probable cause for every individual in a large and “potentially riotous” group). 
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maintained qualified immunity.292 This section examines an outlier Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals opinion that § 1983 defendants have begun to 
cling to,293 which found that the legal standard for probable cause in mass 
arrest cases is not clearly established.294 
In 2015, the Tenth Circuit examined whether the differences between 
Ybarra and Pringle rendered the law on probable cause in multi-suspect 
arrests unclear.295 In Callahan v. Unified Government of Wyandotte County, 
a group of police officers sued their employer for violating their Fourth 
Amendment rights.296 The employer had reason to believe that SWAT unit 
officers were stealing property from homes while executing search war-
rants.297 The employer created a sting operation designed to catch the 
thieves. During the search, some officers unlawfully appropriated property 
while others did not. The problem was they were all wearing headgear that 
covered their faces and bulky uniforms, which made it impossible to ascer-
tain the identity of the thieves. As a result, all officers were arrested after 
they returned to police headquarters. Following their arrest, an investigation 
revealed that only three officers had stolen property during the search. The 
innocent officers sued alleging that their rights had been violated by the 
group arrest.298 
The Tenth Circuit first examined the parameters of qualified immunity. 
It stated that only law enforcement defendants who are plainly incompetent 
or who knowingly violate the law maintain immunity from suit.299 The 
court stated that the law violation must be “so obviously improper that any 
reasonable officer would know it was illegal” because courts are not in the 
position to “second-guess judgments of law enforcement with the benefit of 
hindsight.”300 The Callahan court, thus, found that the district court had 
erred in focusing its attention on a generic analysis of probable cause in-
stead of exploring the law on group arrests:301 
The proper and properly-focused inquiry is whether the law was 
clearly established that an officer could not arrest an entire small 
                                                                                                                           
 292 Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639. 
 293 See Appellants’ Reply Brief at 11 n.2, Valdez v. Derrick, No. 15-cv-00109 (10th Cir. Jan. 
6, 2017), 2017 WL 106914 (citing Callahan, 806 F.3d 1022); Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, 
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 294 Callahan, 806 F.3d at 1028. 
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group when he knows some unidentifiable members, if not all 
members, of that group have committed a crime. This question of 
probable cause in multi-suspect situations is far from beyond de-
bate.302 
The court then stated that this debate began with a conflict between Ybarra 
and Pringle. The Callahan plaintiffs argued that Ybarra required officers to 
have particularized probable cause, yet their employer had arrested every-
one despite knowing that only some SWAT officers had committed theft.303 
In other words, the law enforcement employer decided to arrest first and 
investigate second. 
Next, the court rebuked the district court for ignoring the Pringle opin-
ion, which it believed muddied the law on probable cause determinations in 
multi-suspect arrests.304 After discussing the facts and holdings of both 
Ybarra and Pringle, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the contrasting opinions 
rendered the law unclear and thus, the arresting officers maintained their 
immunity.305 The court lamented that Pringle’s circumstances did not trans-
late to different facts—more suspects, a larger crime scene, a different 
charge—nor did the Pringle Court’s questionable analysis.306 It nevertheless 
concluded that: 
Before we hold officers liable, we must ensure that they were fairly 
put on notice that their actions were unlawful. The contours of the 
law must be sufficiently drawn so that a reasonable officer knows 
when he is acting outside of those lines—the law must be clearly 
established. That was simply not the case here. Though Ybarra re-
quires particularized probable cause, Pringle raises questions re-
garding how that requirement is satisfied in multi-suspect situa-
tions. . . . We cannot ask officers to make a legal determination—
that law professors probably could not agree upon—without any 
guidance from the courts and then hold them liable for guessing in-
correctly. Qualified immunity exists to prevent exactly that. Plain-
tiffs offer us no other case on point to establish that Defendants 
violated their clearly established rights by arresting the entire 
unit.307 
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In the end, the Callahan court held that the employer did not waive its qual-
ified immunity from suit by arresting all SWAT unit officers.308 
There are two notable flaws with the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning. First, 
the Callahan court focused exclusively on Ybarra and Pringle in its opin-
ion.309 It never mentioned the Pringle Court’s critical discussion of Di Re. 
The Pringle Court stated that the difference between Di Re and Pringle was 
that officers in Pringle were unable to ascertain who committed the crime, 
whereas in Di Re, the officers had probable cause to believe that only two of 
the three men were engaged in criminal activity,.310 The Pringle Court stat-
ed that when officers can single out who committed the crime, the law re-
quires that officers arrest only those people.311  
In Callahan, however, the police-employer knew from observing the 
surveillance video that only some of the officers on the SWAT team were 
stealing.312 Although the uniforms made it impossible to determine who 
was stealing while they were being surveilled, the employer later narrowed 
the guilty group to three officers following an investigation.313 An investiga-
tive detention, versus a full-fledged arrest of the group, could have estab-
lished who possessed the stolen goods after the search. Investigatory deten-
tions are designed to sort out who committed a crime whereas group arrests 
net everyone, innocent and guilty alike. In Callahan, all officers were 
placed under arrest (in front of their colleagues, no less) when they returned 
to the police headquarters. The employer had reasonable suspicion to con-
duct an investigatory detention; however, a group arrest was unwarranted. Di 
Re was directly on point, given Callahan’s facts. Not only did the Tenth Cir-
cuit overlook Di Re entirely, it failed to properly analyze whether the employ-
er had probable cause to arrest everyone in the group or just some individuals 
in the group, or whether at the time of arrest, the employer had mere rea-
sonable suspicion to detain and investigate. All facts point to the presence 
of reasonable suspicion, not probable cause. 
Second, the Pringle Court was careful to limit its holding to its unique 
facts: the three men were sitting in a small car and appeared to be engaging 
in drug dealing with a large amount of cash in the glove compartment and 
five baggies of cocaine in the backseat of the car, giving officers probable 
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cause to arrest them for drug possession.314 The Supreme Court carefully 
distinguished these facts from Ybarra’s tavern-wide search.315 In fact, the 
Callahan opinion discussed these distinctions in its own opinion, yet con-
cluded that the law was unclear and impossible for courts and academics to 
resolve.316 But, if the Pringle Court could contrast small, intimate settings, 
from large, public settings, certainly other courts and law enforcement of-
ficers could do the same.  
Rather than distinguishing these cases on facts, the Callahan court re-
fused to engage in judicial oversight of official rights violations, which is the 
purpose of § 1983. The judges instead threw up their hands, suggested that 
the task of assessing probable cause in multiple-suspect cases was too diffi-
cult (even though countless courts had done it before), and held that the law 
was unclear in group arrest cases.317 No other court has done what Callahan 
did: concede too much too early. Unfortunately, when federal courts refuse to 
carefully analyze facts like the Supreme Court did in Di Re, Ybarra, and 
Pringle, civil rights plaintiffs are unable to pierce immunity and pursue litiga-
tion.318  
IV. WAYS TO REDUCE INCIDENTS OF MASS ARRESTS 
High-volume arrests result in enough litigation, settlements, and angst 
to be more trouble than they are worth. Law enforcement agencies should 
seek to lessen their occurrence. One obvious suggestion is for officers to 
                                                                                                                           
 314 Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371–72 (emphasizing the facts of the case). Chief Justice Rehnquist 
described the situation as follows: 
In this case, Pringle was one of three men riding in a Nissan Maxima at 3:16 a.m. 
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detain and investigate when they have individualized reasonable suspicion 
and to arrest only when they have particularized probable cause. Some po-
lice officers have been able to follow these legal guidelines and maintain 
immunity.319 Several cities have also crafted plans to avoid liability follow-
ing arrests for demonstrations, marches, or other acts of civil disobedi-
ence.320 Even when cities and police departments have plans to lawfully 
arrest groups of people, however, not everyone follows the plan. This sec-
tion will offer a few suggestions to minimize liability in the context of mass 
arrests by recommending measures that safeguard constitutional rights. 
A. Lawful Mass Detentions as an Alternative to Unlawful Mass Arrests 
Far fewer civil rights lawsuits stem from mass detentions lacking rea-
sonable suspicion than mass arrests lacking probable cause.321 Perhaps this is 
because a detention has far fewer legal consequences for individuals than an 
arrest, not to mention, it is a much less intrusive restraint on liberty. It appears 
that would-be plaintiffs feel less litigious when they are released at the scene 
following a brief detention than when they are released from jail following a 
full-fledged arrest. Would-be defendants should keep this in mind. 
A detention is generally predicated upon individualized reasonable 
suspicion.322 On the other hand, a “[m]ass detention, by its very definition, 
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draw from the facts in light of his experience. 
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is based on a lack of individualized suspicion.”323 Logically, it seems like 
unlawful mass detentions would lead to civil rights litigation. But, individu-
alized reasonable suspicion is not always a prerequisite for a lawful deten-
tion.324 
Even though officers must have articulable reasonable suspicion (articu-
lation is achieved through the officers’ detailed explanation for the detention), 
there are times when the detention is evaluated first and foremost by its rea-
sonableness.325 A classic example of this reasonableness-first analysis occurs 
in checkpoint cases where officers create a roadblock designed to briefly de-
tain drivers and passengers, none of whom are individually suspected of 
committing a specific crime.326 Another common lawful mass detention oc-
curs in emergency situations when officers must detain a large group of peo-
ple while securing an area and locating suspects.327 Both of these types of 
detentions, when deemed reasonable, are permissible, even when they result 
in mass detentions. 
Detentions are permitted primarily for investigative purposes,328 to brief-
ly ensure that officers remain safe during encounters with civilians,329 and to 
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 325 See id. (describing reasonableness as the “touchstone of the Fourth Amendment”); United 
States v. Maltais, 403 F.3d 550, 556 (8th Cir. 2005) (concluding that an investigative detention 
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 329 Rowley, supra note 323, at 628 (criticizing this practice). One scholar, Christian Rowley, 
stated: 
The Bostick standard circumvents the traditional requirement of individualized sus-
picion. The decision allows the interdiction of an entire vehicle and the concurrent 
mass detention of a group of individuals without the slightest showing of particular-
ized suspicion. This type of seizure without particularized suspicion was one of the 
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havior that the Fourth Amendment was intended to preclude. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
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resolve ambiguities.330 They are generally far less invasive than arrests. Nev-
ertheless, because a detention can look like an arrest and even morph into 
one, courts must determine whether the detention lasted too long, was imple-
mented in an unacceptable manner, or was otherwise unreasonable in achiev-
ing its purpose.331 Although officers should use the least intrusive means 
available to investigate in the shortest amount of time possible,332 the fact that 
the detention could have been shorter in duration or handled better does not 
necessarily render the detention unconstitutional, as officers must make quick 
decisions in rapidly changing circumstances.333 Courts are reluctant to sec-
ond-guess these decisions, particularly when they involve felonious criminal 
activity, or community or officer safety concerns.334 
Several courts have found legitimate reasons for mass detentions. In 
2012, the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado decided United 
States v. Paetsch, which held that officers acted reasonably in detaining 
drivers and passengers in twenty vehicles for thirty minutes while they 
waited to determine which car contained stolen money and a GPS tracking 
device following a bank robbery.335 The court found that the detention was 
reasonable given the severity of the crime, even when some aspects of the 
detention were troubling.336 In another case decided that year, Bernini v. 
City of St. Paul, the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota upheld 
the detention of a large group of protestors who behaved dangerously be-
cause the detention was short in duration and officers attempted to differen-
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tiate and separate innocent persons from those suspected of engaging in 
criminal activity.337 
Courts are pleased when officers actually investigate and sort out the 
guilty from the innocent before making the decision to arrest individuals.338 
The opposite is true too: courts are displeased when officers round up the 
innocent and guilty alike, making no effort to investigate or distinguish be-
tween detainees.339 Consider what Judge Posner said in a case involving the 
mass arrest of protestors:  
Nothing is more common than for mass arrests in riots or demon-
strations to net a sizable percentage of innocents. Persons know-
ingly involved in a disturbance are quicker to size up the situation 
and flee when the police close in on them; innocents often freeze 
in puzzlement, becoming sitting ducks easily swept up in the po-
lice charge.340 
Posner’s sound observation that in a mass arrest scenario the guilty flee and 
the innocent stay has been true in other mass arrest cases.341 One federal 
court praised “police efforts to sort lawbreakers from bystanders, and to 
advise the latter that they should leave.”342 This kind of reasonableness per-
suades a court to believe that officers acted appropriately. 
Police officers may think that to contain a crisis they must arrest first 
and investigate second. Detaining and investigating simultaneously, howev-
er, is a better and far more constitutionally sound option. Although it is the 
duty of officers to protect members of the public from violent crime and to 
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investigate suspected crime, they are also sworn to uphold the legal stand-
ards for detention and arrest. If the reason for detention can be characterized 
as a general interest in crime control, it is unconstitutional.343 The beauty of 
detentions, however, is that officers, through good investigation, can make 
better arrest decisions that are more likely to fit within the Fourth Amend-
ment’s parameters. 
Police departments and cities should consider training officers to de-
tain en masse before arresting en masse, if the facts warrant such action. Of 
course, officers must still be able to articulate reasonable suspicion for do-
ing so. Detentions are always evaluated for reasonableness; when an of-
ficer’s actions cross that line, he risks exposure to civil liability. But, given 
the small number of lawsuits stemming from mass detentions, their less in-
trusive nature, and their lower threshold requirement, a questionable mass 
detention is better than a questionable mass arrest. 
B. Increased Law Enforcement Training 
Most police departments have in-house training on pertinent criminal 
law and procedural developments. Nevertheless, multiple-suspect and mass 
arrests are important but unlikely training topics. Training on these subjects 
could result in fewer lawsuits against officers, officials, and governments. 
Failure to train officers is a theory of liability under § 1983, albeit a limited 
one.344 The Supreme Court in City of Canton v. Harris held that “inadequa-
cy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where 
the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons 
with whom the police come into contact.”345 The Harris Court stated that 
§ 1983 plaintiffs must establish that the officers’ training was inadequate for 
the tasks the officers were required to perform and the training deficiency 
was closely related to the constitutional violation.346 
Subsequent courts have framed the test another way. The Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals ruled that holding a city liable based upon a failure to 
train theory requires the plaintiff to prove that the city acted with deliberate 
indifference.347 Evidence of “(1) failure to provide adequate training in light 
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of foreseeable consequences; or (2) failure to act in response to repeated 
complaints of constitutional violations by its officers” satisfies the deliber-
ate indifference requirement.348 
In order to hold a municipality or government liable for the deliberate 
indifference of its officers, the indifference must amount to a policy or cus-
tom.349 A single arrest does not establish this level of indifference.350 The 
Second Circuit explained that a “training program is not inadequate merely 
because a few of its graduates deviate from what they were taught.”351 Nev-
ertheless, multiple mass arrest incidents may lead to a finding of liability 
under this theory. 
One would hope that any government forced to settle millions of dol-
lars in damages would learn from a single incident and not repeat its folly. 
New York City, however, was unable to learn from its mass arrest mis-
takes.352 A New York federal district court concluded that because the city 
had several pending lawsuits stemming from multiple instances of mass 
arrests, this fact created a “plausible inference of deliberate indifference” to 
training officers “how to determine individual probable cause, instead of 
sweeping up arrestees en masse.”353 For this reason, police departments and 
governments would be well-advised to conduct and follow special training 
on mass arrests, understanding that once they have unlawfully arrested a 
group, they may be more susceptible to losing their qualified immunity in 
consecutive group arrest civil rights cases. 
C. Diversified Arrest Policymaking Authority 
Section 1983 liability can also attach through governmental officials 
who act as policymakers.354 Chiefs of police, sheriffs, city council mem-
bers, and elected district attorneys have been deemed policymakers liable 
for constitutional torts under § 1983.355 Liability may arise when a policy, 
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ordinance, regulation, decision, or plan results in the deprivation of consti-
tutional rights.356 Officials may be held liable when lawmakers have dele-
gated policymaking authority.357 Policymaking liability may also flow from 
a failure to act when there was a duty to avoid civil rights violations.358 
Whether someone is an official with policymaking authority is a question of 
state law to be decided by judges not juries.359 
Local governments and officials may avoid liability by diversifying 
mass arrest decision-making authority. This could be accomplished by obtain-
ing advice from multiple governmental legal departments before, during, and 
after a high-volume arrest. Many municipalities, governments, states, agen-
cies, and elected officials have legal counsel and even entire legal divisions, 
particularly in mid-sized and larger cities. One purpose of these legal divi-
sions is to limit governmental exposure to litigation and to provide legal 
counsel when civil liability issues arise. Given the expense governments face 
in these types of lawsuits, they should be looking to these legal divisions to 
minimize liability. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that governments “often spread poli-
cymaking authority among various officers and official bodies.”360 Indeed, 
important decision-making authority is often so spread out that any one offi-
cial or entity may have limited decision-making authority.361 It is possible for 
governments and officials to minimize exposure even further by creating a 
checks-and-balances system by which various legal departments and entities 
are consulted prior to the decision to execute a mass arrest.  
It is better practice to develop a policy for group or mass arrests that 
requires legal advisors from various governmental agencies to sanction the 
arrest while suspects are still only detained. Such a plan may minimize the 
potential for constitutional rights violations. For example, the district attor-
ney, a legal representative for the law enforcement agency, the county attor-
ney, and the city council or mayor could agree to hold any decision to arrest 
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a group en masse until it has been screened by more than one lawyer, legal 
department, or advisor. Although it may be desirable to allow some deci-
sions to be made ad hoc,362 greater legal input and increased caution would 
likely reduce civil rights violations and lawsuits. 
A potential danger of this approach is that it could spread liability, ex-
posing more officials to suit.363 But, there is also a danger in allowing only 
one body have control over mass arrest decisions. The Seventh Circuit im-
plied in a mass arrest lawsuit involving nine hundred arrestees that the City 
Council should have “constrain[ed] the [Chicago Police] Superintendent’s 
authority to make mass arrests in demonstration situations” but because it 
did not, it was deemed the policymaker and the city was liable for its deci-
sions.364 The court further suggested that in order for municipalities to be 
shielded from liability, city ordinances should constrain or limit policy-maker 
decisions when it comes to unlawful mass arrests.365 Ultimately, when gov-
ernments are able to pool legal resources to research and apply the law to a 
developing legal problem, it is likely that cooler minds will prevail, greater 
precautions will benefit all concerned, probable cause will be carefully and 
objectively assessed, and incidents of civil liability will be minimized. 
CONCLUSION 
Federal courts have confronted the concept of probable cause as it ap-
plies to multiple-suspect, group, and mass arrests. No court—not the Su-
preme Court in its recent Wesby decision366 nor any other federal court—has 
adopted or sanctioned the concept of “group probable cause” or its equiva-
lent.  
The three Supreme Court opinions addressing probable cause in multi-
suspect searches and arrests, including Pringle, reiterate that probable cause 
must be particularized. This fact alone settles the area of law and puts it be-
yond the realm of debate. Although Pringle was a heavily fact-specific case 
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with little application to future multiple-suspect arrests, Justice Sonya So-
tamayor recently stated in her Wesby concurrence that all probable cause 
determinations are “heavily factbound.”367 It is puzzling, therefore, that the 
Tenth Circuit refused to engage in a factually dense analysis of probable 
cause in Callahan, especially when the actions of the police-employer fell 
so short of satisfying the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause standard to 
justify the arrest of all members of the group. 
 The majority of federal courts that have analyzed group and mass arrests 
have held that the Fourth Amendment does not require different probable 
cause standards for individual versus multiple-person arrests. The probable 
cause requirement should be taken at face value to require that officers have 
particularized probable cause to arrest, regardless of the number of arrestees.  
Whether this means that officers must have individualized probable cause to 
arrest a specific person for a specific crime or particularized probable cause 
that all persons in a riotous mob were acting as one criminal unit, officers 
must demonstrate that their actions were reasonable and the arrest was 
based upon probable cause. In Barham, the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals confirmed this point: “case law addressing large-scale demonstra-
tion scenarios does not suspend—or even qualify—the normal operation of 
the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirements.”368 
When the Framers drafted the Fourth Amendment, it was, in part, de-
signed to eliminate unlawful mass arrests, which were commonplace when 
our nation was just a colony. It is illogical then for a twenty-first century 
federal court to consider sanctioning an arrest that lacks probable cause 
when the Framers sought to eliminate such arrests by ratifying the Fourth 
Amendment more than 200 years ago. 
Citizens whose Fourth Amendment rights were violated by an officer’s 
unlawful arrest deserve a chance to appear in court and litigate their cases. At 
a minimum, when Fourth Amendment rights are violated, plaintiffs should 
have the right to a trial and an opportunity to hold officers, governments, and 
officials accountable for civil rights violations. To prevent them from litigat-
ing violations of their Fourth Amendment rights in court is to devalue the 
Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement entirely. 
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